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ALL THINGS IN PROPORTION? AMERICAN RIGHTS 
REVIEW AND THE PROBLEM OF BALANCING 
Jud Mathews* 
Alec Stone Sweet** 
ABSTRACT 
This Article describes and evaluates the evolution of rights doctrine in the 
United States, focusing on the problem of balancing.  In the current Supreme 
Court, deep conflict over whether, when, and how courts balance rights is 
omnipresent.  Elsewhere, we find that the world’s most powerful constitutional 
courts have embraced a stable analytical procedure for balancing, known as 
proportionality.  Today, proportionality analysis (PA) constitutes the defining 
doctrinal core of a transnational, rights-based constitutionalism.  This Article 
critically examines alleged American exceptionalism, from the standpoint of 
comparative constitutional law and practice.  Part I provides an overview of 
how constitutional judges in other systems use PA, assesses the costs and 
benefits of adopting it, and contrasts proportionality with American strict 
scrutiny.  Part II recovers the foundations of proportionality in American 
rights review, focusing on two critical junctures: (1) the emergence of a 
version of PA in dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in the late nineteenth 
century, the core of which persists today; and (2) the consolidation of the strict 
scrutiny framework in the mid-twentieth century.  Part III demonstrates that 
the “tiered review” regime chronically produces pathologies that have 
weakened rights protection in the United States and undermined the coherence 
of the Supreme Court’s rights jurisprudence.  PA, while not a cure-all for the 
challenges faced by rights-protecting courts, avoids these pathologies by 
providing a relatively systematic, transparent, and trans-substantive doctrinal 
structure for balancing.  We also show that all three levels of review—rational 
basis, intermediate review, and strict scrutiny—have, at various points in their 
evolution, contained core elements of proportionality.  In Part IV, we argue 
that the Supreme Court can and should cultivate a version of PA rooted in  
American constitutional traditions and values. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, disagreement runs deep over the proper role for 
balancing in constitutional rights review: over whether, when, and how courts 
should turn to balancing.  Nor is the problem a new one.  Past struggles over 
the merits of balancing are etched into our constitutional caselaw.1  American 
rights doctrines are a tangle of different tests, some requiring the court to 
“balance” or “weigh” factors, and others taking the form of categorical 
constitutional rules.2  This mix reflects, in part, the changing fortunes of 
balancing, which have waxed and waned over the years.3  In the current 
 
 1 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 964 
(1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Categorization, Balancing, and Government Interests, in PUBLIC VALUES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241, 241–44 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993). 
 2 See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 964–71 (canvassing constitutional balancing tests). 
 3 See infra Part II; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 
1288–89 (2007) (noting that the Supreme Court adopted a balancing approach to First Amendment claims that 
was quite speech protective in the 1940s, which was replaced by a more deferential balancing approach in 
1949).  Of course, the diversity of legal tests in American constitutional law also reflects, in part, the diversity 
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Supreme Court, conflicts over its legitimacy regularly flare into view; today, a 
new struggle over balancing is coming to dominate the politics of rights in 
America.4 
The picture looks quite different elsewhere.  In contrast to the United 
States, constitutional courts in legal systems around the world have converged 
on a method for adjudicating rights claims—proportionality analysis (PA)—an 
analytical procedure with balancing at its core.  In the past half-century, PA 
has become a centerpiece of jurisprudence across the European continent, as 
well as in common law systems as diverse as Canada, South Africa, Israel, and 
the United Kingdom.5  PA, which began as an unwritten set of general 
principles of law, has evolved into a standardized doctrinal framework that 
courts can apply across substantive areas of law.  Today, judges have raised 
proportionality to the rank of a fundamental, constitutional principle, which 
they deploy to manage rights claims, including conflicts between constitutional 
rights.  PA has also been adopted by the most powerful international courts, 
including the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, 
and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization.6  In a previous 
article, we elaborated a theory of why judges are attracted to PA; we traced the 
 
in the structure of rights found in the Constitution.  Some rights lend themselves easily to formulations as 
constitutional rules (e.g., “no quartering of soldiers”), and others are more easily read to invite balancing tests 
(e.g., due process). 
 4 In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), Justices Scalia and Breyer engaged in an 
unusually acerbic argument about the appropriate methodology to employ in review of a District of Columbia 
measure that banned handguns in the home and required that other firearms be rendered inoperable.  Writing 
for a five-member majority, Justice Scalia focused on the early history of the United States in order to show 
that the Second Amendment possessed a categorical, rule-like structure.  Id.  Once the Court determined that 
the Second Amendment guaranteed an individual right to bear arms for self-defense, the law was struck down.  
Id. at 635.  On the issue of balancing, Justice Scalia stated that the Second Amendment, like the First, “is the 
very product of an interest-balancing by the people—which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them 
anew,” yet Justice Scalia also claimed: “We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core 
protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”  Id. at 634–35.  For his part, 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg in dissent, asserted that a “sort of 
‘proportionality’” balancing approach is regularly used in “various constitutional contexts, including election-
law cases, speech cases, and due process cases.”  Id. at 690 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Advocating an “interest-
balancing inquiry” that “asks whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is 
out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental interests,” Justice Breyer 
then adopted a relatively standard version of three-stage proportionality analysis to show why the District of 
Columbia’s ban should be upheld.  Id. at 689–90, 693–719.  For extended discussions of Heller’s debate over 
balancing, see Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009); Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller: The 
Proportionality Approach in American Constitutional Law, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 367 (2009). 
 5 See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72 (2008). 
 6 See id. at 138–59. 
MATHEWS&SWEET GALLEYSFINAL  5/26/2011  8:59 AM 
800 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60 
framework’s global diffusion outward from Germany after World War II; and 
we showed that adopting PA serves to enhance the importance of rights, and of 
judicial authority, within policy processes otherwise dominated by nonjudicial 
officials.7 
This Article takes a fresh look at alleged American exceptionalism in the 
field of rights review, from the perspective of proportionality.  It complements 
our previous study of the global diffusion of PA by focusing comparative 
attention on American experience and practice.  Our analysis shines new light 
on American doctrinal developments and challenges the image of the United 
States as an outlier.  Strikingly, we find that U.S. courts did develop 
frameworks for rights review that resembled PA, starting in the nineteenth 
century.  The Supreme Court first derived the functional equivalent of PA as a 
test for state restrictions on trade under the dormant Commerce Clause.  And in 
the mid-twentieth century, strict scrutiny review emerged as a rights-favoring 
balancing framework with pronounced similarities to PA.  It turns out that 
American judges chose proportionality in the past and introduced it into our 
doctrinal DNA. 
But this heritage is sometimes obscured in current rights jurisprudence and 
scholarly discourse.  The nearest analogue to PA today—the closest thing we 
have to a common rubric for reviewing claims across different substantive 
areas—is the set of standards that makes up tiered scrutiny.8  Not only do PA 
and tiered review share certain core elements but, we argue, in a head-to-head 
comparison, PA has clear advantages.  Far from balancing rights away, PA can 
protect rights more consistently and coherently than can tiered review.  The 
American approach limits the flexibility of judges in the face of complexity, 
falsely portrays adjudication as a mechanical exercise in applying law that is 
akin to a “constitutional code,”9 and creates unnecessary inconsistency and 
arbitrariness. 
 
 7 See generally Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5. 
 8 Canonically, the tiers are strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.  The picture 
is complicated somewhat by less well-established gradations (e.g., “rational basis with bite”).  Also, the 
Supreme Court does not always use these three labels.  Kathleen Sullivan points out that tests for a number of 
constitutional claims, from privileges and immunities issues to public-forum speech regulations, amount to 
intermediate scrutiny, even when the Court does not apply such a label.  Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal 
Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297 (1992). 
 9 See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5, at 88. 
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Our purpose is not to heap abuse on tiered review for its own sake; its 
shortcomings have already been amply canvassed by scholars10 and judges.11  
Rather, we seek to show, constructively, how incorporating PA can remedy 
problems of our constitutional practice.  Proportionality’s extraordinary 
success—its value to the judges who have adapted it for use in very different 
legal systems—lies in the fact that it provides a doctrinal anchor for principled 
balancing as a mode of rights protection.  We argue that American rights 
review lacks such an anchor and suffers as a result.  Nor does moving toward 
PA mean adopting an exotic foreign transplant.  Instead, this move would 
reclaim and build on the foundations that already exist in our own history and 
doctrine.  We seek to show how courts can construct a modern, distinctly 
American PA that squares with the practices of common law constitutionalism, 
including a respect for history and precedent. 
Together, our claims add up to what we regard as the strongest case for 
recognizing and incorporating features of PA into American constitutional law.  
To be clear, we are not proposing that PA should necessarily govern every 
constitutional rights claim.  Nor do we regard proportionality as a miracle cure-
all that will make hard constitutional questions easier to answer.  PA does not 
spare judges the hard work of theorizing the nature and scope of a right in play 
(a process that triggers PA) nor does it dictate correct answers.  PA does 
require that judges—openly, routinely, and without embarrassment—engage in 
balancing, and many will find this posture uncomfortable.  Nonetheless, to the 
extent that balancing is inevitable in rights adjudication, the proportionality 
framework offers the best available procedure for doing so. 
The Article is organized as follows.  In Part I, we introduce PA as an 
argumentation framework, summarize the pros and cons of adopting 
proportionality as a standardized mode of rights adjudication, and contrast PA 
with American approaches in broad, relatively abstract terms.  Building on the 
theoretical treatment of proportionality in our last article,12 we argue that PA 
offers a number of systemic advantages relative both to tiered review and to 
more rule-based, categorical approaches.  In Part II, we uncover the 
 
 10 See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 484–91 (2004); 
Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 161 (1984); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996). 
 11 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 478 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1976) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
 12 See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5. 
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foundations of proportionality in American rights review, focusing on two 
critical junctures: (1) the emergence of a form of proto-proportionality in 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in the late nineteenth century, and (2) the 
consolidation of the strict scrutiny framework in the mid-twentieth century.  
We demonstrate that both of these developments, which mirrored simultaneous 
stages in the evolution of PA in Germany, laid a foundation for a structured but 
suitably flexible approach to rights review.  In Part III, we subject the major 
features of American rights doctrine, as it currently exists, to critical analysis 
in the light of PA principles.  Part IV considers how to give PA principles 
greater expression in American constitutional law and responds to objections. 
I. PROPORTIONALITY AND STRICT SCRUTINY: AN OVERVIEW 
In constitutional systems across the globe, proportionality balancing today 
constitutes the dominant, “best practice” judicial standard for resolving 
disputes that involve either a conflict between (a) two rights claims or (b) a 
rights provision and a legitimate government interest.  In the latter, 
paradigmatic situation, the analysis proceeds step by step, as follows.  In a 
preliminary phase, the judge considers whether a prima facie case has been 
made to the effect that a government act burdens the exercise of a right.13  By 
convention, the judge will use this occasion to discuss the jurisprudential 
theories that underpin the pleaded right, as well as prior rulings and other legal 
materials that will bear upon the court’s determination of the right’s scope and 
application in the case at hand.  No important claim will ever be rejected at this 
stage.  PA then proceeds through a sequence of three tests.  A government 
measure that fails any one of these tests violates the proportionality principle 
and is therefore unconstitutional. 
The first stage of PA mandates inquiry into the “suitability” of the measure 
under review.  The government must demonstrate that the relationship between 
the means chosen and the ends pursued is rational and appropriate, given a 
stated policy purpose.14  This mode of scrutiny is broadly akin to what 
Americans call “rational basis” review, although under PA, the appraisal of 
government motives and choice of means is more searching.  In most systems, 
few laws are struck down at this stage.15 
 
 13 See id. at 75. 
 14 See id. 
 15 Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence, 57 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 383, 389 (2007). 
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The second step—“necessity”—embodies what Americans know as a 
“narrow tailoring” requirement.  At the core of necessity analysis is a least-
restrictive-means (LRM) test, through which the judge ensures that the 
measure at issue does not curtail the right more than is necessary for the 
government to achieve its goals.16  For many courts, including the Canadian 
Supreme Court17 and the European Court of Justice,18 the necessity stage is the 
heart of the analysis, and the majority of laws struck down by these courts 
failed the LRM test.  In practice, judges do not invalidate a measure simply 
because they can find one less restrictive alternative.19  Instead, most courts, 
explicitly or implicitly, insist that policymakers have a duty to consider 
reasonably available alternatives and to refrain from selecting the most 
restrictive among them.  Most courts will rarely if ever strike down a law 
without comparing it to a list of reasonably available alternatives. 
The third step—balancing stricto sensu—is also known as “proportionality 
in the narrow sense.”20  In the balancing phase, the judge weighs, in light of the 
facts, the benefits of the act (already found to have been narrowly tailored) 
against the costs incurred by infringement of the right, in order to decide which 
side shall prevail.  Most judges who use PA would not characterize balancing 
in such blunt, utilitarian terms.21  Instead, they would emphasize that the 
balancing stage allows them to “complete” the analysis, in order to ensure that 
no factor of significance to either side has been overlooked.  In contrast to the 
practices of the high courts of Canada and the European Union, for example, 
the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Israeli Supreme Court tend to 
move more systematically to the final balancing stage, especially when they 
 
 16 See Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 517, 520–24 (2007) (identifying LRM testing as a “central meaning” of the narrow tailoring 
requirement, criticizing an alternative approach to narrow tailoring in racial preference cases, and calling for a 
return to LRM testing). 
 17 See Grimm, supra note 15, at 384. 
 18 JÜRGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 857 (2006). 
 19 See, e.g., RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, 342 (Can.) (“The 
tailoring process seldom admits of perfection and the courts must accord some leeway to the legislator.  If the 
law falls within a range of reasonable alternatives, the courts will not find it overbroad merely because they 
can conceive of an alternative which might better tailor objective to infringement.”); Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. 
JTI-Macdonald Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610, 631 (Can.) (making a similar point). 
 20 Robert Alexy, Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality, 16 RATIO JURIS 131, 135 (2003). 
 21 Following German practice, PA is not a jurisprudence of interests but of constitutional “principles” 
and “values.”  ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 86–93 (Julian Rivers trans., 2002); 
DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 45–48 
(1997). 
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confront controversial “hard cases.”22  A court that strikes down a law as 
unconstitutional in the third stage of PA will typically use the first two steps to 
pay its respects to the importance of the purposes pursued by the government 
and to the quality of the government’s own deliberations on the proportionality 
of the law.23 
Before turning to a more nuanced discussion of balancing within PA and 
strict scrutiny, two crucial comparative points deserve emphasis.  First, in the 
United States, opponents of judicial balancing have largely built their case on 
the view that balancing is necessarily ad hoc, open-ended, and unprincipled 
from the standpoint of rights protection.24  The conclusion, often presented as 
an easy assumption, is that judicial balancing is an inherently undisciplined 
exercise of unbridled law making that deprives rights of their a priori 
normative status, for example, as “trumps” or “shields” against government 
action.25  This characterization does not easily fit PA.  PA is a highly 
formalized argumentation framework, the basic function of which is to 
organize a systematic assessment of justifications for government measures 
that would burden the exercise of a right.  A government must explain such 
acts, which PA subjects to the highest standard of judicial scrutiny.  In doing 
so, PA enhances the transparency of rights review, not least by making explicit 
the justifications for limiting rights the court has either accepted or rejected 
and at precisely what stage of the analysis.  Second, as a formal doctrinal 
structure, PA is on its face no less intrusive, “strict,” or rights-prioritizing, than 
is American strict scrutiny.  In the United States, however, strict scrutiny is 
only applied to a small number of rights, whereas PA is applicable to virtually 
all rights claims. 
A. Balancing 
In classic notions of separation of powers, the responsibility to balance the 
varied, multidimensional costs and benefits to society of any set of public 
policy options belongs to legislative authority.  PA does not challenge that 
view.  Instead, it subjects the balancing that inheres in policy making to 
 
 22 See Grimm, supra note 15, at 393–95; Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5, at 135–37. 
 23 See, e.g., HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Gov’t of Isr. 58(5) IsrSC 807 [2004], translated 
in Isr. L. Rep. 264 (2004) (striking down the proposed route of Israel’s security fence as disproportionate in the 
strict sense after finding that it satisfied the first two standards of proportionality). 
 24 See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 984–95. 
 25 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) 
(discussing situations in which individual rights may trump public goals). 
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judicial supervision.  PA is thus directly implicated in the exercise of 
legislative power.  Indeed, PA forges important causal connections between 
judicial balancing and the exercise of law-making authority, and between law 
making and the evolution of constitutional rights jurisprudence.  Moreover, PA 
comprises a multi-stage balancing framework; that is, judicial balancing is not 
restricted to the final balancing-in-the-strict-sense stage, but takes place within 
each of the tests.  And the tests are sequenced in order of increasing stringency, 
so that courts insert themselves into the legislative process no more than is 
necessary to defend rights.  If a measure does not survive the inquiry into the 
means–ends fit, the court need not escalate to a more probing form of 
balancing analysis.  Consider again the paradigmatic case, wherein a pleaded 
right (x) comes into conflict with the means employed by a given measure to 
achieve a stated government purpose (y).  Under PA, the court must assess the 
harm (to value x) against the contribution (to value y) of a policy decision, but 
it does so in three different ways.  In the first two stages, the court examines 
the means–ends nexus, assessing how lawmakers themselves weighed costs 
and benefits.  The “suitability” test will normally capture laws where the 
mismatch between means and ends is most acute—irrational or grossly 
overbroad laws that exact a cost in terms of rights while accomplishing little to 
nothing.  The second test, necessity analysis, enables judges to probe intentions 
of legislators in much more detail, not least to smoke out bad motives.26  If the 
court finds that lawmakers had less-restrictive alternatives, it overturns the law 
as a disproportionate exercise of legislative authority.  Thus, the court moves 
to balancing in the strict sense only after the measure has survived scrutiny into 
how the legislator has already balanced the values in tension.  If the 
government is to prevail in the final phase of PA, the court must agree that the 
measure under review generates enough added benefit (to value y) to justify 
the harm (to value x). 
Judges who would construct rights in absolute terms, or who would prefer 
to build fixed hierarchies of constitutional values, or who would seek to ban 
balancing from their repertoires for other reasons, will have no use for PA.  In 
contrast, most judges who use PA presume that balancing cannot be avoided in 
rights adjudication.  Modern systems of rights protection delegate massive law-
making authority to constitutional judges, typically under institutional 
arrangements that we have characterized as “structural judicial supremacy.”27  
 
 26 See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 436–37 (1997). 
 27 Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5, at 86 (“Modern constitutionalism is characterized by structural 
judicial supremacy, where the principals have, in effect, transferred a bundle of significant ‘political property 
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In effect, judicial supremacy is a tax that a polity pays for maintaining a 
modern system of constitutional justice.  In such systems, judges do not use PA 
to mask balancing, or to camouflage law making, but to rationalize both within 
the protective confines of a stable procedure that they see as inherently 
judicial. 
B. Proportionality and Judicial Power 
In our previous article, we developed a theory to explain why constitutional 
and supreme courts would find the proportionality framework attractive.  Our 
explanation blended strategic (political) and legal (norm-governed) factors and 
logics, theorized in particular ways.28  In a nutshell, we argued that judges are 
attracted to PA because: (a) it neatly “fits” the structure of qualified rights; (b) 
it prioritizes rights protection while giving judges flexibility to tailor outcomes 
to highly charged political contexts; and (c) it provides a stable, defensible 
framework for argumentation and justification that judges can deploy to reduce 
uncertainty and to enhance consistency and predictability.29  We then charted 
the global diffusion of PA to the most powerful constitutional and supreme 
courts in the world.  As we demonstrated, these courts adopted PA in order to 
deal with the most politically salient and controversial cases that they could be 
expected to face.  In every system examined, we also found that the move to 
PA served to enhance the status of rights and the judiciary’s role in both law-
making processes and the overall process of constitutional development.  The 
institutionalization of the framework places nonjudicial actors in an ever-
deepening shadow of rights adjudication.  In consequence, policymakers 
become increasingly careful to build records of the proportionality of their own 
decision making, knowing full well that their decisions will be subject to 
review by the courts under PA.  Further, all relevant actors in the system, 
including future litigants and their lawyers, government officials, and legal 
scholars, gradually begin to think of their roles in terms of proportionality, 
further consolidating PA’s centrality. 
Proportionality balancing necessarily exposes judges as lawmakers and 
raises the classic legitimacy dilemmas associated with such exposure.30  At the 
same time, PA provides various means of coping with these dilemmas, which 
 
rights’ to judges, for an indefinite duration.”); see also id. at 85–96 (discussing the concept of structural 
judicial supremacy with reference to balancing). 
 28 Id. at 80–97. 
 29 Id. at 87–90. 
 30 Id. at 80–87. 
MATHEWS&SWEET GALLEYSFINAL  5/26/2011  8:59 AM 
2011] ALL THINGS IN PROPORTION? 807 
partly accounts for the framework’s popularity.  Here we highlight four 
strategic advantages that PA offers the balancing, rights-protecting judge. 
First, adopting the proportionality framework comprises an effective 
procedural response to an intractable substantive problem.  Constitutional 
rights are famously imprecise, open-ended, and incomplete in other important 
ways, and these qualities are amplified when provisions are qualified by 
limitation clauses.  While a shift to balancing is, arguably, an appropriate 
response to incompleteness, it can only reinforce the perception that rights 
adjudication is outcome indeterminate.  Nonetheless, judges can bring a 
semblance of determinacy to balancing by subjecting it to a fixed procedure, 
the most formalized and well tested of which is PA.  As important, PA offers 
judges the possibility of building trans-substantive coherence, since it can be 
applied across the board, to virtually all disputes involving rights. 
Second, PA bestows a sheen of politico-ideological neutrality on a court, 
across time and circumstances.  In any dispute, one party—or constitutional 
value—will ultimately prevail against the other, but only with regard to a 
specific context or set of facts.  Under PA, it is not the law that varies from 
case to case, but the facts or decision-making context.  In a future case 
involving a conflict between the same two values, the other side may well 
prevail if circumstances lead the judge to weigh the values in tension 
differently.  PA maximizes the court’s flexibility vis-à-vis all potential litigants 
in future cases and gives the court a structured setting in which to pay equal 
respect and honor to each constitutional value on its own, and in competition 
with one another, before determining a winner. 
Third, PA is specifically designed to reduce the harm to the losing party as 
much as possible.  The point, formalized by Robert Alexy, follows from the 
view that (a) rights, and the constitutional values that must be balanced against 
rights, are “legal principles,” as distinguished from “legal rules”; and (b) a 
conflict between two principles requires that both be “optimized” through 
balancing.  However rights are conceptualized, necessity analysis requires 
narrow tailoring, which permits the judge to access the legitimizing logics of 
Pareto optimality.31  Under PA, a government measure that restricts a right 
more than is necessary to achieve a legitimate state purpose can never be 
justified, since the right claimant can be made better off with no additional cost 
to the value being pleaded by the government. 
 
 31 ALEXY, supra note 21, at 40–110. 
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As a practical matter, we can expect PA to constrain judicial law making in 
ways that can be tracked empirically, insofar as judges actually assess the 
proportionality of government measures with competence and in good faith.  
As mentioned, a court will rarely strike down a law in the necessity stage 
unless it can demonstrate that the law infringes more on the right than a range 
of other explicitly identified, “reasonably available alternatives.”  In our view, 
judges gain an important strategic resource when they treat this (defensive) 
practice as a de facto constitutional duty.  Similarly, in the balancing stricto 
sensu phase, many judges assume an obligation—we would call it a 
constitutional duty—to be as precise as possible about how they weigh the 
contribution of a government act to value y (the government’s legislative 
purpose) compared to the harm of that measure to value x (a pleaded right). 
Fourth, adopting PA is a way for courts that seek to secure their bona fides 
in the field of rights protection to build their credibility.  The recognition of PA 
as a “best-practice standard” of global constitutional law is the outcome of an 
ongoing social process of diffusion, and of legitimation, that has occurred on a 
global scale.  This process has all the hallmarks of what sociological 
institutionalists call “institutional isomorphism,” in that PA’s diffusion has 
become subject to logics of mimesis and increasing returns (bandwagon 
effects).32  Faced with similar problems, judges copy what they take to be the 
emerging, high-prestige standard, thereby ensuring the result.  For new 
constitutional courts—or for old courts charged with protecting a new charter 
of rights—embracing PA is a low-cost move, compared to the costs of 
developing an untested alternative on their own.  Finally, PA is a simple but 
comprehensive doctrinal structure, which facilitates diffusion.  Lawyers, law 
students, and judges can learn the basics quickly and deploy the framework 
with ease, which benefits constitutional judges in obvious ways. 
Steadfast opponents of PA may well concede these points while 
maintaining their objections.  Although critiques vary in subtlety and 
sophistication, most share a common hostility toward judicial balancing per se 
and a suspicion of judicial law making and supremacy.33  Consider the 
following provocative statement, with which we would agree: “If we ask the 
 
 32 The classic treatment is Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 63, 67–69 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991). 
 33 See, e.g., Stavros Tsakyrakis, Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 468 
(2009); Grégoire C. N. Webber, Proportionality, Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship, 
23 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 179 (2010). 
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question—what does a person have by virtue of a right?34—the answer, under 
PA, is that a right gives a right-bearer an entitlement to have her claim 
evaluated under the proportionality framework, and nothing more.” 
Many who believe that rights express (or positivize as constitutional law) 
moral principles,35 or that rights constitute shields (against government 
action),36 or that rights have a categorical, rule-like quality (rather than being 
“principles” to be optimized),37 will also share a commitment to the belief that 
a more principled mode of rights protection is possible to achieve.  We are 
skeptical that judges can or should dispense with balancing when they 
adjudicate rights claims, for reasons argued through this Article, but we do not 
deny that balancing may require some to rethink certain deeply held 
assumptions about the nature of rights and of rights adjudication. 
With respect to separation of powers, PA is clearly not a neutral, analytical 
procedure.  Compared to alternatives, PA is a highly intrusive standard of 
judicial review.  Wherever it has been adopted, PA replaced more deferential 
standards.  (Judges can build de facto deference into PA on an ad hoc basis, but 
deference, too, is an outcome of the analysis and, thus, a product of judicial 
decision making.)  Those, like Jeremy Waldron, who have taken the view that 
rights adjudication adds nothing of value to the quality of policy deliberations, 
and who believe that principles of democracy are violated by systems in which 
courts have “the final word,” must attack PA as inherently undemocratic.38  It 
is obvious that PA positions constitutional judges as powerful lawmakers and 
that, under conditions of structural supremacy, judges will often dominate law-
 
 34 See Mattias Kumm, Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the 
Proportionality Requirement, in LAW, RIGHTS AND DISCOURSE: THEMES FROM THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF 
ROBERT ALEXY 131, 131 (George Pavlakos ed., 2007).  The answer given to Kumm’s question is ours, and not 
necessarily Kumm’s. 
 35 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184–205 (1977) (arguing that moral aspects 
of rights make balancing inappropriate except in emergency situations); Kai Möller, Balancing and the 
Structure of Constitutional Rights, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 453, 458–61 (2007) (arguing that constitutional rights 
ought to be described from the standpoint of substantive morality). 
 36 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 415, 429 (1993) 
(describing constitutional rights in the United States as “shields”). 
 37 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001) (arguing that 
the rule-like structure of the First Amendment requires inquiry into government purpose and forbids 
balancing); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179–80 (1989) 
(arguing that rights as rules limit the balancing discretion of judges and commit them to judicial restraint).  The 
broader literature is reviewed in Blocher, supra note 4. 
 38 See Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators, in 23 THE SUPREME 
COURT LAW REVIEW 7 (Grant Huscroft & Ian Brodie eds., 2d Ser., 2004); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the 
Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). 
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making processes and the evolution of the constitutional law.  We see such 
outcomes as costs that any polity must inevitably pay if it wishes to maintain 
an effective system of constitutional justice.  If a polity does not wish to pay 
such costs, it must not, within its constitutional law, include a charter of rights 
meant to be protected by a judicial body whose decisions are effectively 
insulated from reversal. 
In contrast to the views of more fervent supporters of PA,39 we deny the 
claim that PA gives a unique, correct answer to complex legal questions 
involving the interpretation and application of rights.  As we have already 
stated, PA is an analytical procedure, a framework for assessing justifications 
for government policy that would infringe upon rights.  PA does not tell judges 
what weight to give constitutional values that are in tension.  At best, when 
used properly, PA guides or constrains how judges balance once they have a 
sense of how the contending values are to be weighed.  Put differently, 
balancing will always require some background notions or theories of the 
nature and scope of rights, the proper role of the state in the society, economy, 
or private life, and so on.  PA does not supply these background ideas.  
Further, it is far from clear that any court can actually test the “necessity” of a 
government measure with any precision, let alone determine which policy 
options fall along a presupposed “Pareto frontier.”  These are specific 
examples of the generic, potentially irresoluble problem with balancing.  
Balancing typically involves weighing two goods that are formally 
incommensurable in that the respective values cannot be measured on the same 
scale or metric. 
In our view, these are valid points, though different conclusions can be 
drawn from them.  An opponent of PA may well conclude that, at best, PA is 
little more than fancy, doctrinal window dressing for what is, in fact, generic 
law making by any other name.  From the same facts, we conclude only that 
rights adjudication can never be dissociated from law making; that it will 
regularly involve difficult cases; that there exists no stable, compelling 
alternative to balancing; and that PA provides the most defensible balancing 
structure currently available.  We will seek to defend the latter two points in 
the remainder of the Article. 
 
 39 See, e.g., DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159–76 (2004). 
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C. Strict Scrutiny 
Given the importance of strict scrutiny to rights protection in the United 
States, one might assume that American readers would need no introduction to 
it.  Until recently, however, little systematic research on the origins, evolution, 
or law and politics of the doctrine existed.40  Since 2005, several important 
pieces on the topic have appeared, including articles by Richard Fallon,41 
Stephen Siegel,42 G. Edward White,43 and Adam Winkler.44  In this Article, we 
seek to contribute to this literature as well as to a rapidly emerging 
comparative research agenda.45 
Although we will compare PA and strict scrutiny throughout the Article 
(most directly in Part III), we wish to emphasize four general points in advance 
of the analysis to follow.  First, as noted, PA overlaps strict scrutiny in crucial 
respects.  In addition to sharing constitutive components, in the form of tests, 
both frameworks displaced doctrines that were far more deferential to 
legislative power and government authority.  In the United States, what makes 
the scrutiny “strict” is the fact that it negates the normal presumption that 
legislation will be treated as constitutionally valid unless the law fails basic 
rationality requirements.  When the Supreme Court decides to protect a right 
under strict scrutiny, the Court’s de facto supremacy within law-making 
processes is fully realized. 
Second, the Supreme Court developed strict scrutiny in order to deal with a 
set of specific strategic problems.46  Fallon describes the standard as “a 
 
 40 We do not mean to understate the importance of research that bears upon how the Court has used (and 
has changed how it uses) strict scrutiny in specific cases or areas of the law, on which there are dozens of 
important articles. 
 41 See Fallon, supra note 3. 
 42 See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 355, 359–60 (2006). 
 43 G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 44 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the 
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006). 
 45 On the comparative agenda, see BEATTY, supra note 39; Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 4; Stephen 
Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2007); Mattias Kumm, Constitutional 
Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 574 (2004) 
(reviewing ALEXY, supra note 21).  In 2010, Law & Ethics of Human Rights, edited by Iddo Porat and Moshe 
Cohen-Eliya, among others, dedicated two symposium issues to the topic of “Rights, Balancing & 
Proportionality.”  See Symposium, Rights, Balancing & Proportionality, 4 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1 
(2010). 
 46 Fallon puts it as follows: 
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judicially crafted formula for implementing constitutional values,” specifically, 
those rights determined to be “preferred” or most “fundamental.”47  But he also 
insists that the Court needed something like strict scrutiny “to impose 
discipline, or at least the appearance of discipline, on judicial decisionmaking 
and thus to escape the taint both of Lochneresque second-guessing of 
legislative judgments and of flaccid judicial ‘balancing.’”48  As we have 
argued throughout this section, PA too gives rights-protecting courts a means 
to rationalize and discipline judicial review, and balancing in particular.  It is 
also true that, at times, the Court seeks to render balancing invisible, notably 
by treating a right as quasi-absolute. 
Third, strict scrutiny contains within it space for balancing—indeed, strict 
scrutiny began as a structure for balancing—and the Court has never been able 
to banish balancing from it.49  As we describe in more detail in the next Part, 
the modern strict scrutiny formula was first consolidated in First Amendment 
cases, where it represented a more rigorous and rights-favoring update of an 
approach to expressive rights that the Court had long employed.  As Stephen 
Siegel points out, the rights absolutists Black and Douglas concurred in the 
early First Amendment decisions applying strict scrutiny, rather than join the 
Court’s opinion, so as not to endorse a balancing approach to rights.50  Indeed, 
the structure is sometimes overtly deployed as a “weighted” or “all-things-
considered balancing test.”51  Generally, however, the scope for balancing 
within the strict scrutiny framework contracted sharply by the end of the 
1960s, owing to the framework’s embrace by an ascendant civil libertarian 
majority on the Supreme Court and its migration into equal protection 
 
In the 1960s, the Warren Court was eager first to establish and then to consolidate a doctrinal 
structure sharply differentiating preferred from ordinary constitutional rights.  With rational basis 
review established as the norm in run-of-the-mill cases, this strategy required the development of 
an implementing test or tests to protect preferred rights.  Strict judicial scrutiny . . . furnished an 
attractive model . . . . 
Fallon, supra note 3, at 1335. 
 47 Id. at 1268. 
 48 Id. at 1270. 
 49 See Siegel, supra note 42, at 394–97.  Siegel shows that strict scrutiny was not, in its original guise, 
designed to aid motive analysis by “smoking out” illicit motives.  Id. at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Rather, the formula was a refinement of the balancing-of-interest approach that had long appeared in First 
Amendment cases.  See id. (“When the Court introduced narrow tailoring and the compelling state interest 
standard into First Amendment analysis, it did so as part of its general ‘balancing/cost-benefit justification’ 
approach to First Amendment questions.”).  Only later, once it migrated into the equal protection context, was 
strict scrutiny deployed as a tool for smoking out illegitimate motives.  Id. at 394–97. 
 50 Id. at 394–95. 
 51 Fallon, supra note 3, at 1306. 
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jurisprudence, where it was typically deployed to a different end: to ferret out 
illegitimate motives.52 
The fourth point follows from the third.  To allow proportionality analysis 
in domains where tiered review now occupies the field is not, as some critics 
would have it, somehow unprincipled or unsanctioned by precedent.  To the 
contrary, restoring balancing is faithful to the foundational strict scrutiny 
precedents and recovers an aspect of our constitutional practice that has been 
obscured.  This point is developed further in Parts II and IV. 
II. ROOTS OF PROPORTIONALITY IN U.S. RIGHTS REVIEW 
Building on those final two points, this Part seeks to recover a lost history 
of proportionality, or perhaps “proto-proportionality,” in American rights 
doctrines.53  Our aim is not to offer a comprehensive or definitive history, but 
rather a high-speed and selective tour, focusing on those sites that hold 
particular interest from a comparative perspective on rights adjudication.  We 
look not only at the consolidation of the strict scrutiny framework in the 1950s 
and 1960s, but also chart the development of dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine in the late nineteenth century.  In both instances, we find doctrinal 
structures with striking resemblances to proportionality, both formally and 
functionally.54 
The picture that emerges stands in sharp contrast to the view of those who 
claim a fundamental incompatibility between proportionality and American 
constitutionalism.55  To the contrary: doctrinal structures that approximate 
proportionality are a recurrent feature of our constitutional practice, dating 
back more than a century.  Given the importance of doctrinal continuity in 
American law, exposing this history subtly shifts the burden of justification: 
 
 52 See infra text accompanying notes 179–82. 
 53 In a similar spirit, Thomas Sullivan and Richard Frase identify sites in American doctrine, 
constitutional and otherwise, where some form of proportionality principle operates.  See E. THOMAS 
SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW 53–168 (2009).  This 
undertaking is important, but different from our own.  Sullivan and Frase take a somewhat more capacious 
view of proportionality than we do, and they identify a large number of areas of law where some form of 
interest-balancing exercise takes place.  See id. at 6–7.  We are focused specifically on doctrinal structures that 
anticipate the multistep framework of modern proportionality analysis, where judicial scrutiny mounts through 
a prescribed sequence of stages, culminating in means–ends testing and then balancing stricto sensu.  As we 
show below, this same sequence of steps emerges more than once, in different areas of constitutional doctrine. 
 54 See infra Part III.A (highlighting similarities between mid-century rational basis review and 
proportionality). 
 55 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008). 
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the move to reject a proportionality-based balancing framework requires 
explanation at least as much as the move to embrace it. 
A.  The Dormant Commerce Clause 
The early dormant Commerce Clause cases deserve our attention for a 
number of reasons.  It is in this domain that the LRM test first appears as a 
stable feature of American constitutional law, along with the “undue burden” 
standard.56  Second, in asserting judicial authority to review the necessity of 
state “police acts,” the Court had to overcome the view, deeply held by many 
judges at both the state and federal levels, that assessing the necessity of public 
policy was a legislative, not a judicial, function.  Third, the Court’s dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence was part and parcel of a broader move to give 
rigorous constitutional protection to freedom of contract and property rights.  
The Court would retreat from this stance post-New Deal, of course, but not in 
the domain governed by the dormant Commerce Clause.  Last, viewed 
comparatively, the Court’s doctrine in the area is all but indistinguishable from 
PA.  We will explore each of these points in turn. 
Since Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in the 1829 case Willson v. Black 
Bird Creek Marsh Co., the Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce 
Clause57 as authorizing the states to “regulate commerce in its dormant 
state.”58  States in the Union possess a presumptive “right” to use their police 
powers to regulate market activity, in the absence of federal preemption, albeit 
under the supervision of the federal courts.  Prior to the Civil War, the U.S. 
Supreme Court confronted few (if any) important cases in the area, and it 
established no lasting doctrine that is relevant here.59  During the period from 
 
 56 Guy Miller Struve claims that the “roots of the principle” go back at least to Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 
133 (1894).  Guy Miller Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1464 n.4 (1967).  In fact, Lawton absorbs the LRM test from prior dormant Commerce 
Clause cases. 
The first glimmers of LRM testing appear even earlier.  In the 1821 case Anderson v. Dunn, 
challenging an exercise of the congressional contempt power, the Court ruled that Congress may only employ 
“the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.”  19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230–31 (1821).  But it took 
several decades before this test was employed systematically in an important doctrinal area, as we describe in 
the main text. 
 57 “The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 58 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829). 
 59 The one case still cited, see, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 
550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007), is Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), in which the Court 
considers the basis for permitting local governments to take measures that would affect commerce: 
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1875 to 1902, the Court faced a rising tide of litigation brought by merchants 
and traders seeking to invalidate state regulations whose effect was to prohibit 
or burden interstate commerce.  It met this challenge by developing a full-
fledged version of PA: the Court begins with an inquiry into the legitimacy and 
importance of state purposes; it then assesses the necessity of the regulations 
through the deployment of an LRM test; and it fashions a place for balancing, 
in the form of an unreasonable burden standard.  During this period, the Court 
also derived, from the Commerce Clause, an individual right to buy and sell 
goods across borders.60 
The LRM test first surfaced in the 1875 Supreme Court decision Chy Lung 
v. Freeman.61  The case involved the extortion of Chinese immigrants by 
California officials who claimed that impounding shipping vessels and their 
cargo—in this case, women alleged to be sex workers—was necessary to 
secure the public order.62  Although the facts are not typical for a dormant 
Commerce Clause case, the Supreme Court ritually cited Justice Miller’s 
decision in all cases throughout the seminal period: 
We are not called upon by this statute to decide for or against the 
right of a State, in the absence of legislation by Congress, to protect 
herself by necessary and proper laws against paupers and convicted 
criminals from abroad; nor to lay down the definite limit of such 
right. . . .  Such a right can only arise from a vital necessity for its 
exercise, and cannot be carried beyond the scope of that 
necessity. . . .  The statute of California goes so far beyond what is 
necessary, or even appropriate, for this purpose, as to be wholly 
without any sound definition of the right under which it is supposed 
to be justified.63 
Two years later, in Railroad Co. v. Husen, the Court confronted a Missouri 
embargo on “Texas, Mexican, [and] Indian” cattle, which was put in place for 
 
Now the power to regulate commerce embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but 
exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single 
uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every port; and some, 
like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet 
the local necessities of navigation. 
Id. at 319. 
 60 See infra text accompanying notes 71–81. 
 61 92 U.S. 275 (1875). 
 62 Id. at 278–79. 
 63 Id. at 280. 
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eight months of the year.64  The State argued that the measure was necessary 
on health grounds, given that these particular cattle carried diseases that could 
infect and devastate Missouri’s herds.65  A unanimous Court struck down the 
law.66  In dicta, Justice Strong noted that the State had legitimate interests in 
regulating interstate commerce under a number of public policy headings, 
including “domestic order, morals, health, and safety.”67  He continued: 
We are thus brought to the question whether the Missouri statute 
is a lawful exercise of the police power of the State. . . .  It 
may . . . be admitted that the police powers of a State justifies the 
adoption of precautionary measures against social evils. . . . 
. . . While we unhesitatingly admit that a State may pass sanitary 
laws, and laws for the protection of life, liberty, health, or property 
within its borders; while it may prevent persons and animals 
suffering under contagious or infectious diseases, or 
convicts . . . from entering the State; while for the purpose of self-
protection it may establish quarantine, and reasonable inspection 
laws, it may not interfere with transportation into or through the 
State, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection.68 
In his ruling, Justice Strong noted that neither the Missouri legislature nor the 
Missouri Supreme Court (upholding the law) had considered less restrictive 
alternatives to an outright ban, such as a quarantine or animal inspections.69  
Either option would have protected a valid state interest while reducing the 
burden on interstate commerce.  This appears to be plain PA: Because 
Missouri chose the complete “destruction” of commerce70 when less intrusive 
options were reasonably available, the law could not stand. 
Still missing from this emerging framework was a conception of individual 
constitutional rights.  The Court first began to fill this lacuna explicitly in the 
1890 case Minnesota v. Barber.71  The litigation targeted a Minnesota statute 
that prohibited the sale of fresh meat unless the livestock was inspected—
within the state—a maximum of twenty-four hours before its slaughter.72  The 
statute was facially neutral, applying to all such products regardless of origin, 
 
 64 95 U.S. 465, 468–69 (1877). 
 65 Id. at 473. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 470–71. 
 68 Id. at 470–72. 
 69 Id. at 472. 
 70 Id. at 470. 
 71 136 U.S. 313 (1890). 
 72 Id. at 318. 
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which Minnesota argued should insulate the law from censure.73  But because 
of the twenty-four-hour time limitation, slaughterhouses in the surrounding 
states would find it impossible to transfer their cattle for inspection, ship them 
back to the slaughterhouse for processing, and then return the meat to 
Minnesota for sale.74  The case thus involved generally applicable measures 
that created differential burdens that, plaintiffs claimed, constituted 
discrimination.  Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan accepted the state’s claim 
that the law “was enacted, in good faith, . . . to protect the health of the people 
of Minnesota,” but then struck it down.75  The state’s defense of the law, 
Harlan complained, 
ignores the right which the people of other States have in commerce 
between those States and the State of Minnesota.  And it ignores the 
right of the people of Minnesota to bring into that State, for purposes 
of sale, sound and healthy meat, wherever such meat may have come 
into existence.76 
Moreover, the statute failed the LRM test, among other reasons, because it did 
not recognize the efficacy of the inspection and certification processes in place 
in home states of slaughterhouses.77  Here we find the germ of what 
international trade law today calls the principle of mutual recognition, which 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) articulated in its celebrated free movement 
of goods judgment, Cassis de Dijon.78  The U.S. Supreme Court would also 
 
 73 Id. at 326.  The Court rejected this assertion: 
To this we answer, that a statute may, upon its face, apply equally to the people of all the States, 
and yet be a regulation of interstate commerce which a State may not establish.  A burden 
imposed by a State upon interstate commerce is not to be sustained simply because the statute 
imposing it applies alike to the people of all the States, including the people of the State enacting 
such statute. 
Id. 
 74 Id. at 322. 
 75 Id. at 319, 329–30. 
 76 Id. at 329 (emphases added). 
 77 Id. at 322 (“It will not do to say—certainly no judicial tribunal can with propriety assume—that the 
people of Minnesota may not, with due regard to their health, rely upon inspections in other states of animals 
there slaughtered for purposes of human food.”). 
 78 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), 1979 
E.C.R. 649.  The ECJ explicitly speaks of the right of individuals to engage in intra-European Community 
trade, which it derived from the prohibition of nontariff barriers under Article 28 of the European Economic 
Community Treaty.  There is another important parallel between Cassis de Dijon and Minnesota v. Barber.  In 
Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ (controversially) extended proportionality review to national market regulations that 
applied equally to goods, regardless of their origin.  Prior to Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ limited proportionality 
review to measures that directly regulated trade.  See MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE 
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come to rely heavily on the principle of mutual recognition, when performing 
its own necessity analysis. 
By the turn of the twentieth century, the Court had expressly recognized a 
constitutional right to buying and selling across state borders.  In Reid v. 
Colorado, another case involving a state’s regulation of trade in livestock 
under the heading of protecting health, Justice Harlan stated for the Court: 
Now, it is said that the defendant has a right under the 
Constitution of the United States to ship live stock from one State to 
another State.  This will be conceded on all hands.  But the defendant 
is not given by that instrument the right to introduce into a State, 
against its will, live stock affected by a contagious, infectious or 
communicable disease, and whose presence in the State will or may 
be injurious to its domestic animals.  The State—Congress not having 
assumed charge of the matter . . . —may protect its people and their 
property against such dangers, taking care always that the means 
employed to that end do not go beyond the necessities of the case or 
unreasonably burden the exercise of privileges secured by the 
Constitution of the United States.79 
Justice Harlan thus neatly expressed the constituent elements of PA.  Although 
the standard of scrutiny is as robust as any in the Court’s repertoire, the Court 
nonetheless upheld the necessity of Colorado’s measure,80 as it had done in 
prior cases.81 
There is an evident awkwardness to the Court’s derivation from the 
Commerce Clause of an individual, constitutional right to trade across state 
borders, let alone the treatment of such a right as impossible to impugn in a 
legal proceeding.  Nowhere does the Federal Constitution proclaim such a 
right, and in formal terms, the right’s existence depends entirely upon the U.S. 
Congress not taking action under the Commerce Clause.  Yet, by the time Reid 
v. Colorado was decided, the Court had already embarked on its venture to 
construct and defend property rights as “preferred freedoms” (in all but name).  
Not surprisingly, the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence of this period 
 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION 106–09 (1998); ALEC STONE 
SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 109–45 (2004). 
 79 187 U.S. 137, 151 (1902) (first two emphases added). 
 80 Id. at 152–53. 
 81 Compare Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461 (1894) (upholding a state law regulating the sale of 
margarine on consumer protection grounds), with Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898) (striking 
down as unconstitutional a state law regulating the sale of margarine on LRM grounds). 
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became imbued with the Court’s position on freedom of contract, and due 
process more generally. 
Doctrinally, the Court prioritized economic liberty as a constitutional value 
by constructing a prototype of PA, or strict scrutiny.  At its core is an LRM 
test.  Although the LRM test was born in dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, it quickly spread to other areas in which the courts reviewed 
state police power regulations restricting economic freedom.82  It did so, in our 
view, because it broadly fit a general orientation of the judiciary to recognize a 
sphere of private liberty—in the form of vested economic rights—that was 
viewed by the judicial elite as constituting an inherent, but not quite absolute, 
restriction on the exercise of legislative authority.83 
In looking back over the foundational dormant Commerce Clause cases, it 
is important to note the variability of outcomes: sometimes the challenged 
measure was upheld, and sometimes it was struck down.  Like PA and strict 
scrutiny, dormant Commerce Clause analysis imposes a burden of justification 
on the state, and the justifications offered will be subjected to searching 
 
 82 Howard Gillman explains this development succinctly.  See Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: 
The Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 POL. RES. 
Q. 623, 629–34 (1992).  Nineteenth-century judges understood the legislative power to have built-in limits: 
legislation that interfered with private liberty or property interests was legitimate only when it promoted the 
general welfare of the whole.  Id. at 629.  When legislative acts could not be so justified—when they were 
arbitrary or class legislation, enacted for the benefit of certain groups—they would be held to be improper 
exercises of legislative power and, hence, invalid.  Id.  By the late nineteenth century, federal courts had come 
to police the boundaries of legislative power with a form of LRM test.  Id. at 634.  Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 
133 (1894), illustrates this approach in practice.  The case concerned a New York statute that declared fish nets 
in the vicinity of two waterways to be a public nuisance and subject to abatement and destruction by any 
person.  Id. at 135–36.  This provision was alleged to exceed the state’s police power.  The Court framed its 
approach to the question as follows: 
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, 
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require 
such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment 
of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.  The legislature may not, under the 
guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose 
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.  In other words, its determination 
as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the 
supervision of the courts. 
Id. at 137.  Ultimately, the Court sided with the state, while strongly voicing its support of property rights more 
generally.  Id. at 142–43.  Three Justices dissented on the grounds that, in their view, the State had violated the 
plaintiff’s constitutional right to property because necessity had not been met.  Id. at 144 (Fuller, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 83 Moreover, congressional powers were limited to the exercise of those powers enumerated in Article I, 
Section 8 of the Federal Constitution.   
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scrutiny.  But these frameworks do not contain, in and of themselves, anything 
like a strong presumption that the measures under review are unconstitutional.  
One of the virtues of proportionality balancing is that it allows a court to claim 
doctrinal consistency while retaining flexibility across time and cases.  Courts 
commit a strategic error when they destroy this virtue by using the framework 
in an outcome-determinate way and, in effect, rigging outcomes in advance.  
The Supreme Court grew increasingly rigid in its jurisprudence of property 
rights and due process in the early twentieth century, just as it did years later 
with respect to strict scrutiny.84  The discredit and analytical difficulties that 
ensued from these doctrinal moves add support to our case for PA. 
PA and strict scrutiny are still balancing frameworks whose use will 
inexorably blur distinctions between legislative and judicial functions.  In the 
dormant Commerce Clause cases of the pre-New Deal era, the Court routinely 
confronted resistance to LRM testing, on the part of state judges and some of 
its own members.  As Justices Gray and Harlan charged, dissenting in 
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania: necessity analysis cannot be separated from 
“questions of fact and of public policy, the determination of which belongs to 
the legislative department, and not to the judiciary.”85  We think that the PA-
style framework that emerged in the late nineteenth century made sense in the 
dormant Commerce Clause domain, just as it does today.  Dormant Commerce 
Clause cases involve important constitutional values that routinely conflict 
with one another in our federal polity, and being highly context-specific, they 
are difficult to resolve using a more rule-based approach.  Further, insofar as 
the Court deploys LRM testing rigorously and effectively, states will be led to 
reduce reliance on measures that facially discriminate against out-of-state 
goods and services.  Instead, they will turn to measures that are equally 
applicable to all goods, services, and traders.  If state purposes are, in fact, 
protectionist in nature, some states will always be tempted to disguise these 
purposes by claiming some important or compelling public interest.  This is, in 
fact, what happened.  In response, the Court began to deploy LRM testing as a 
means of “smoking out” protectionist motives, using an undue burden test to 
deal with the residual interests at stake.  This approach is defensible given the 
importance of an overarching value: the building and maintenance of market 
federalism. 
 
 84 See infra text accompanying note 187. 
 85 171 U.S. at 29–30 (Gray, J., dissenting). 
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By the end of the 1950s, the Supreme Court had abandoned the task of 
protecting economic liberties under the Due Process Clause.  The basics of 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, however, remained largely intact, 
although two changes deserve mention.  First, the post-New Deal era witnessed 
the virtual disappearance of reference to the constitutional right of individuals 
to engage in interstate commerce—although remnants of this right remain 
today, as Granholm v. Heald confirms.86  Instead, the Court came to rely on 
one of several (largely compatible) theories of the Commerce Clause to justify 
jurisdiction.87  This change has had little, if any, practical effect on how parties 
litigate cases, or how the Court decides them.  Not so with regard to the second 
change.  In the 1950s, the Court began to treat state and local regulations that 
facially discriminate against interstate commerce as presumptively 
unconstitutional,88 although the state or local authority could, in theory, rebut 
that presumption by showing that its interest was both sufficiently important 
and “unrelated to economic protectionism.”89  Some Justices began explicitly 
using the phrase “strict scrutiny” to describe what the Court did in such 
cases.90  The more difficult litigation, of course, concerns facially neutral 
 
 86 544 U.S. 460, 473 (2005) (“Laws of the type at issue . . . . deprive citizens of their right to have access 
to the markets of other States on equal terms.  The perceived necessity for reciprocal sale privileges risks 
generating the trade rivalries and animosities, the alliances and exclusivity, that the Constitution and, in 
particular, the Commerce Clause were designed to avoid.”). 
 87 Compare H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) (“Our system, fostered by 
the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the 
certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his 
exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them.”), with Donald H. Regan, The 
Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
1091 (1986) (arguing that the dominant value protected by the dormant Commerce Clause is “national unity,” 
and that the Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause corrects one of the main defects created by the Articles 
of Confederation—the ability of states to legislate benefits for their own citizens at the expense of the rest of 
the nation), and Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979) (noting that caselaw in this domain 
“reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional 
Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward 
economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the 
Articles of Confederation”), and S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938) 
(“Underlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed in judicial opinion, that when the regulation 
is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not 
likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects 
adversely some interests within the state.”). 
 88 See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). 
 89 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–55 (1992). 
 90 See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 360 
(2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Court has long subjected discriminatory legislation to strict scrutiny, and 
has never, until today, recognized an exception for discrimination in favor of a state-owned entity.”); cf. C & A 
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market regulations that incidentally burden interstate commerce.  The leading 
decision is Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., which puts balancing at the core of the 
framework: 
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes 
affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general 
rule that emerges can be phrased as follows: Where the statute 
regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, 
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.91 
Although dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is one of the most durable 
structural features of American constitutional law, it has also been subjected to 
relentless attacks both from within and beyond the Court, and these assaults 
have mounted steadily in the past two decades.  The most recent dormant 
Commerce Clause case of significance, United Haulers, provides a good 
example.  In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts succinctly 
summarized the core elements of this established doctrine.92  He then 
proceeded to balancing (weighing the benefits of a county ordinance in dealing 
with a waste management crisis against the costs to trucking companies of 
higher tipping fees), finding that “any arguable burden the ordinances impose 
on interstate commerce does not exceed their public benefits.”93  In his 
concurrence, Justice Scalia reiterated his view that the whole edifice of 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine was “an unjustified judicial invention” 
with no constitutional foundation.94  He further dismissed the “so-called ‘Pike 
balancing’” on the grounds that “[g]enerally speaking, the balancing of various 
values is left to Congress—which is precisely what the Commerce Clause (the 
real Commerce Clause) envisions.”95  Whereas Justice Scalia would adhere, 
restrictively, to the judicial enforcement of the dormant Commerce Clause “on 
 
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994) (characterizing standard as “rigorous 
scrutiny”); id. at 422 (Souter, J., dissenting) (characterizing standard as “virtually fatal scrutiny”). 
 91 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 92 550 U.S. at 338–39, 346 (“Discriminatory laws motivated by ‘simple economic protectionism’ are 
subject to a ‘virtually per se rule of invalidity,’ which can only be overcome by a showing that the State has no 
other means to advance a legitimate local purpose. . . .  [But t]he Counties’ . . . ordinances are properly 
analyzed under the test set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., which is reserved for laws ‘directed to 
legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental.’” (citations omitted)). 
 93 Id. at 347. 
 94 Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 
(1997) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 95 Id. at 348–49. 
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stare decisis grounds,”96 Justice Thomas would “discard” the Court’s 
jurisprudence altogether, for similar reasons.97  The attack on balancing has 
also been as ferocious on the part of leading academic commentators in the 
area, notably, Donald Regan.98 
We conclude on a comparative note.  The Supreme Court’s approach to the 
dormant Commerce Clause, whether viewed from the vantage point of the year 
1900 or the year 2000, would be immediately recognizable to any European as 
a familiar, remarkably straightforward version of proportionality.  The 
proportionality framework first emerged as a principle of European public law 
in the German States, notably Prussia, during precisely the same period—the 
late nineteenth century.99  In the 1970s, the ECJ developed a virtually identical 
framework to deal with “free movement of goods” litigation under the Treaty 
of Rome.100  These cases, brought by traders challenging Member State market 
regulations in the national courts, dominated the ECJ’s docket throughout the 
1970s and 1980s.101  The ECJ used PA, in this and related areas, to help jump-
start efforts to complete the Single Market in the face of protectionism and 
 
 96 Id. at 348. 
 97 Id. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The negative Commerce Clause has no basis in 
the Constitution and has proved unworkable in practice.  As the debate between the majority and dissent 
shows, application of the negative Commerce Clause turns solely on policy considerations, not on the 
Constitution.  Because this Court has no policy role in regulating interstate commerce, I would discard the 
Court’s negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.” (citations omitted)).  Regarding balancing, Justice Thomas 
had this to say: 
To the extent that Congress does not exercise its authority to make that choice, the Constitution 
does not limit the States’ power to regulate commerce.  In the face of congressional silence, the 
States are free to set the balance between protectionism and the free market.  Instead of accepting 
this constitutional reality, the Court’s negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence gives nine 
Justices of this Court the power to decide the appropriate balance. 
Id. at 352. 
 98 Simplifying a complex position, Regan argues that the courts should rarely engage in LRM testing and 
never engage in balancing, under Pike or any other authority, but should limit themselves exclusively to 
inquiry into “legislative purpose.”  If the Court finds discriminatory purpose, then it must strike down the law.  
Regan further argues that the Supreme Court does not really balance at all, although it claims to do so.  See 
Donald H. Regan, Judicial Review of Member-State Regulation of Trade Within a Federal or Quasi-Federal 
System: Protectionism and Balancing, Da Capo, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1853, 1870–71 (2001); Regan, supra note 
87.  We find many of Regan’s readings of the Court’s caselaw strained at best, and his interpretation seems 
impossible to square with the two most recent Supreme Court rulings in the area, United Haulers and 
Granholm v. Heald. 
 99 See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5, at 101 (“[B]y the late nineteenth century, German 
administrative courts were striking down [state] police actions that violated proportionality, which was 
conceptualized at that time as an enforceable LRM test.”). 
 100 STONE SWEET, supra note 78, at 109–45. 
 101 Id. 
MATHEWS&SWEET GALLEYSFINAL  5/26/2011  8:59 AM 
824 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60 
collective action failures on the part of the Member States.102  In the WTO, the 
Appellate Body would later adopt PA to deal with the legal issues that most 
resemble those faced by the Supreme Court and the ECJ.103  It may be that 
market integration can proceed across state borders without courts as 
commitment devices and without intrusive but flexible doctrines like 
proportionality, but we are skeptical.104 
While the comparative parallels are compelling, it is also obvious that the 
Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has maintained an affinity to 
strict scrutiny that reaches back more than a century.  While the familiar strict 
scrutiny formula, coupling a compelling governmental interest standard with 
an LRM test, first appeared in First Amendment105 and equal protection 
jurisprudence,106 it is striking and significant that a functional equivalent 
developed in the nineteenth century within the Court’s approach to the 
Commerce Clause, and later, to property rights more generally.  Indeed, a 
plausible case can be made for the view that the origins of strict scrutiny are 
neither in equal protection law nor in First Amendment jurisprudence, as is 
commonly argued,107 but are found within the Court’s approach to the 
Commerce Clause.  One might even conclude that the Court repurposed a 
doctrinal structure originally developed to protect one era’s set of “preferred 
freedoms”—property rights, in the pre-New Deal period—to serve the set of 
values favored in a later era—free speech and civil rights, in the post-war 
years. 
B. Strict Scrutiny and Rights Protection 
In the twentieth century, dormant Commerce Clause doctrine was an island 
of stability in a sea of constitutional upheaval.  The heightened scrutiny of 
 
 102 Id. 
 103 See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5, at 152–59. 
 104 For a view of courts and judicial review as guarantors of credible commitments between federated 
states engaged in market-building projects, see WALTER MATTLI, THE LOGIC OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: 
EUROPE AND BEYOND (1999); STONE SWEET, supra note 78, at 7–9, 109–45 (with reference to Europe); Jenna 
Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court’s “Unsteady Path”: A Theory of Judicial 
Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1995) (with reference to the United States); Martin 
Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 321 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca 
eds., 1999). 
 105 See Siegel, supra note 42 (arguing that strict scrutiny first emerged in First Amendment cases). 
 106 See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD: THE SUPREME COURT UNDER STONE AND VINSON, 
1941–1953, at 89–90 (1997) (locating strict scrutiny’s origins in equal protection doctrine). 
 107 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 3 (arguing that strict scrutiny emerged almost simultaneously in a number 
of areas). 
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police power actions infringing economic liberties did not last.  It was 
overtaken by the decisive changes in the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence during the New Deal, when the Court famously relaxed its 
scrutiny of social and economic legislation.108  But in a broader view, those 
changes of the New Deal Court were part of a still larger redistribution of 
judicial scrutiny that took two more decades to complete.  The Court’s retreat 
from a generalized scrutiny of legislation preceded—and precipitated—a 
concentration of scrutiny around a set of “preferred” freedoms.109  The favored 
technique for testing restrictions on those freedoms, reached after years of 
experimentation and conflict, was strict scrutiny. 
Drawing on recent scholarship, this section briefly describes the origins of 
strict scrutiny and corrects two common misconceptions.  First, strict scrutiny 
emerged from First Amendment doctrine, not from equal protection 
doctrine.110  Second, and more important for our purposes, the Supreme Court 
introduced strict scrutiny not as a rigid, outcome-determinative rule, but “as 
part of its general ‘balancing/cost-benefit justification’ approach to First 
Amendment questions.”111 
By the 1930s, the Supreme Court had begun to afford social and economic 
legislation a presumption of constitutionality112 through application of a 
rational basis test: legislation forfeits the presumption only when it lacks a 
rational basis in the law.113  Time and again, the Court demonstrated just how 
weak a constraint this was.114 
But another development paralleled this slackening of scrutiny.  The 
Court’s new posture of deference heightened the concern of some Justices that 
important civil liberties remained underprotected.  The idea that certain rights 
deserve increased protection had advocates on the Court for years, including 
 
 108 See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding an order of the New York Milk 
Control Board that fixed milk prices); Shaman, supra note 10, at 162–63. 
 109 See Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution, 
by virtue of the First and the Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms [of speech and religion] in a 
preferred position.”). 
 110 Siegel, supra note 42, at 364–80. 
 111 Id. at 394. 
 112 See Shaman, supra note 10, at 161–63. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding the 
constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute prohibiting persons other than optometrists or ophthalmologists from 
fitting or replacing lenses); see also infra Part III.A. 
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Justices Harlan, Holmes, and Brandeis.115  The presumption of 
constitutionality lowered the baseline of protection and made those concerns 
all the more pressing.116  Carolene Products’ famous footnote four gave voice 
to this anxiety.  The presumption of constitutionality may have a “narrower 
scope,” Justice Stone submitted, when legislation runs up against specific 
constitutional prohibitions, notably those found in the Bill of Rights.117  Justice 
Stone also identified two other classes of statutes that deserve greater scrutiny, 
previewing two of the abiding preoccupations of the Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence over the next half-century: legislation affecting the political 
process and legislation targeting minorities.118  This footnote in Carolene 
Products expressed the ambition of the bifurcated review project: to develop 
an elevated standard of review in order to complement rational basis review for 
those rights requiring special solicitude.119  But it was some time before the 
Court arrived at a stable formula for operationalizing this solicitude for 
“preferred” rights—namely, strict scrutiny analysis. 
It is often asserted—not least, in the opinions of the Supreme Court—that 
strict scrutiny originated in equal protection cases dating from the 1940s,120 
Skinner v. Oklahoma121 and Korematsu v. United States.122  But while the 
phrases “strict scrutiny” and “most rigid scrutiny” appear in these decisions,123 
the Court actually applied strict scrutiny in neither case.124  As Stephen Siegel 
argues, the roots of strict scrutiny analysis are in fact found in First 
 
 115 See Gillman, supra note 82, at 640–44. 
 116 Id. at 640–47. 
 117 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 118 Id. 
 119 The phrase “bifurcated review project” is G. Edward White’s.  See G. Edward White, The First 
Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
299, 301 (1996).  White argued that the start of this project predates Carolene Products and was motivated 
specifically by a desire to afford heightened protection to speech rights.  Id. at 301–02, 308–23. 
 120 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124–
28 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Goldberg, supra note 10; Greg Robinson & Toni 
Robinson, Korematsu and Beyond: Japanese Americans and the Origins of Strict Scrutiny, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Spring 2005, at 29; Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach 
to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 n.1 (2000). 
 121 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 122 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 123 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
 124 Indeed, the phrase strict scrutiny appears in isolated decisions dating back to the late nineteenth 
century.  See Winkler, supra note 44, at 798 n.10 (citing, inter alia, Altschuler v. Coburn, 57 N.W. 836, 838 
(Neb. 1894), and Booher v. Worrill, 57 Ga. 235, 238 (1876)).  We follow Stephen Siegel in taking strict 
scrutiny to consist of three parts: (1) a burden shifting to the government to justify the constitutionality of its 
law, and the requirement that a statute must be (2) “narrowly tailored” to serve (3) “a compelling state 
interest.”  See Siegel, supra note 42, at 359–60. 
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Amendment cases from the late 1950s and early 1960s.125  And in looking 
there, we find that strict scrutiny originated not as a blunt hammer for striking 
down legislation, but a flexible instrument that combined new and old 
doctrinal elements to balance the benefits and costs of rights-infringing 
legislation.126 
The consolidation of strict scrutiny capped a decades-long struggle on the 
Court over how much protection to afford First Amendment rights, and by 
means of which doctrinal techniques.127  This contest for the soul of the First 
Amendment, which is outlined only in broad strokes here,128 generated a good 
deal of doctrinal innovation, as Justices angled for advantage within a 
densifying matrix of precedents by introducing new tests or altering existing 
ones.  A narrow majority of civil libertarian Justices generally held the upper 
hand from the late 1930s through the early 1950s, upholding most First 
Amendment challenges to speech-restrictive statutes, often by applying the 
“clear and present danger” test.129  These Justices also employed a balancing 
analysis in a rights-protecting manner, by acknowledging the “preferred 
position” of First Amendment rights.130  For instance, in a case concerning 
municipal restrictions on the distribution of handbills, Justice Roberts 
explained: 
In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the rights 
is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the 
challenged legislation.  Mere legislative preferences or beliefs 
respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation 
directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such 
as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of 
democratic institutions.  And so, as cases arise, the delicate and 
 
 125 See Siegel, supra note 42, at 361–80. 
 126 Good accounts of this development from different perspectives can be found in Fallon, supra note 3, at 
1285–97, and Gillman, supra note 82, at 640–44. 
 127 See MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 46–107 
(1966). 
 128 For a more comprehensive treatment, see id. 
 129 Id. at 58.  The test was originally articulated in Justice Holmes’s 1919 opinion for the Court in Schenck 
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case is whether the words used are used in 
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about 
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”). 
 130 SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 76–78 (describing balancing as an adjunct of the clear and present danger 
and preferred position doctrines).  Marsh v. Alabama offers a concise statement of how the 1940s Court 
deployed balancing in the service of civil liberties: “When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of 
property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain 
mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position.”  326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).  The author is, of all 
people, Justice Black, who would later become balancing’s most persistent critic on the Court. 
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difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to 
appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the 
regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.131 
In the hands of the speech-favoring Justices, the balance was usually—but not 
always—struck in favor of the rights claimant.  During this period, the Court 
also used narrow tailoring to protect speech rights, especially in the challenges 
to time, manner, and place restrictions on speech.132 
The tide began to turn toward a less speech-protective jurisprudence 
starting in the late 1940s, under the leadership of Justice Frankfurter.  
Successive majorities limited the applicability of the clear and present danger 
test, watered it down, or adopted a highly deferential balancing test instead.133  
The decision in Dennis v. United States embodied the new approach.134  
Dennis, the head of the U.S. Communist Party, was convicted under the Smith 
Act for conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the government by force and 
violence.135  In upholding his conviction, a plurality of the Court adopted 
Learned Hand’s reformulation of the clear and present danger test: “In each 
case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its 
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the 
danger.”136  By eliminating recognition of the privileged position of rights, this 
formulation invites judges to “balance rights away”: restrictions may be 
permitted when the gravity of evil is high (as with attempts to overthrow the 
government), even when the probability of success is low.  The repeated use of 
deferential balancing tests, along the lines of Dennis, to defeat civil liberties 
claims in the 1950s, gave balancing a bad name among civil libertarians, both 
on and off the Court.137  Additionally, the gap between “low-protectionist” and 
 
 131 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). 
 132 The facts of Martin v. City of Struthers illustrate how narrow tailoring was used.  319 U.S. 141 (1943).  
At issue was a municipal ordinance that forbade the ringing of doorbells for the purpose of distributing 
“handbills, circulars or other advertisements.”  Id. at 142.  The Court concluded that the prohibition violated 
the First Amendment because the measure restricted far more communication than necessary to combat the ills 
targeted by the measure.  Id. at 146–49. 
 133 See, e.g., Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
 134 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 135 Id. at 495–96. 
 136 Id. at 510 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 137 See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 139–44 (Black, J., dissenting); Laurent B. Frantz, 
The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment 
Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245. 
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“high-protectionist” Justices widened, as Justices Black and Douglas 
increasingly endorsed an absolutist view of First Amendment rights.138 
Only when the Court arrived at a formula that combined balancing with a 
heightened regard for rights did the doctrine attain a measure of stability.  The 
seeds of this approach were planted in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, which introduced a compelling state interest test for 
the first time.139  Sweezy concerned the contempt conviction of a New 
Hampshire college professor who refused to answer questions from the State’s 
attorney general about subversive tendencies in his teaching.140  The Court 
decided the case on the narrow ground that the attorney general was acting in 
excess of his remit from the legislature,141 but questioned in dicta whether any 
state interest would justify infringing Sweezy’s First Amendment interest in 
lecturing free from state interference.142  Justice Frankfurter responded to this 
open question in his concurrence: the state could “intru[de] into this activity of 
freedom” but only “for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling.”143  
Justice Frankfurter justified this high bar with a peroration to the importance of 
free academic discourse: “For society’s good,” he wrote, the interchange of 
ideas connected with the social sciences “must be left as unfettered as 
possible.”144 
It is clear from Justice Frankfurter’s discussion that he did not understand 
the compelling interest standard as imposing a rigid, one-size-fits-all 
requirement on state action infringing speech, but rather as creating an 
adaptable test that courts can calibrate to different circumstances.  Whether the 
state’s interest qualifies as “compelling” is not determined in a vacuum but, 
rather, depends on the weight of the free expression interests at stake.  Thus, 
the State’s reason for requiring Sweezy’s testimony was not compelling 
because it was insufficient relative to the costs imposed on First Amendment 
freedoms.  The Court held that, “[w]hen weighed against the grave harm 
resulting from governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a university, 
such justification for compelling a witness to discuss the contents of his lecture 
 
 138 The “low-protectionist” and “high-protectionist” terminology is borrowed from Stephen Siegel.  See 
Siegel, supra note 42, at 362. 
 139 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
 140 Id. at 234–42. 
 141 Id. at 254–55. 
 142 Id. at 251. 
 143 Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 144 Id. 
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appears grossly inadequate.”145  In his Sweezy concurrence, Justice Frankfurter 
did not abandon his customary balancing approach to First Amendment cases.  
Rather, in light of the importance he placed on academic freedom,146 he 
upgraded to a form of balancing more solicitous of the right at stake: a 
balancing with bite. 
Justice Frankfurter’s “compelling state interest” language was invoked 
occasionally in the late 1950s, in cases where the Court struck the balance in 
the government’s favor.147  But it was Justice Brennan who, in the early 1960s, 
incorporated the test into a strict scrutiny framework that would become a 
fixture of First Amendment jurisprudence.148  Justice Brennan fashioned the 
compelling state interest test into an enduring doctrinal settlement that 
“mediated the ‘deadlock’ between the Court’s deferential-balancing and 
absolutist camps.”149  As Stephen Siegel explains: 
On the one hand, as a form of balancing, the compelling interest 
standard recognized that constitutional rights could be subordinated 
to governmental needs in a particular case.  On the other hand, Justice 
Brennan recognized that if the compelling standard could be such a 
rigorous criterion that its application in almost all cases upheld First 
Amendment claims without the need for additional weighing of 
interests in the particular case.150 
As an argumentation framework, strict scrutiny analysis combined a solicitude 
for rights with balancing in a package that the Court would turn to again and 
again. 
Justice Brennan began to put the pieces together in his dissent to Braunfeld 
v. Brown, a 1961 free exercise case concerning Sunday closing laws.151  Justice 
Brennan addressed the question of rights-review methodology head on, stating 
 
 145 Id. at 261; see also id. at 265 (“But the inviolability of privacy belonging to a citizen’s political 
loyalties has so overwhelming an importance to the well-being of our kind of society that it cannot be 
constitutionally encroached upon on the basis of so meagre a countervailing interest of the State as may be 
argumentatively found in the remote, shadowy threat to the security of New Hampshire allegedly presented in 
the origins and contributing elements of the Progressive Party and in petitioner’s relations to these.”). 
 146 See Siegel, supra note 42, at 367. 
 147 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79–81 
(1959). 
 148 As Siegel notes, although courts applied strict scrutiny in several First Amendment cases in the 1960s, 
strict scrutiny only became a cornerstone of First Amendment doctrine in the 1970s, after it had been 
embraced in equal protection jurisprudence. 
 149 Siegel, supra note 42, at 375. 
 150 Id. at 375–76. 
 151 366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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that “[t]he first question to be resolved . . . concerns the appropriate standard of 
constitutional adjudication in cases in which a statute is assertedly in conflict 
with the First Amendment . . . .”152  He invoked the clear and present danger 
test, as framed in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: 
“freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly . . . are susceptible of restriction 
only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may 
lawfully protect.”153  Justice Brennan then assessed the laws’ interference with 
free exercise rights: “Their effect is that no one may at one and the same time 
be an Orthodox Jew and compete effectively with his Sunday-observing fellow 
tradesmen.”154  He next invoked the compelling interest test to move toward 
balancing, asking, “What, then, is the compelling state interest which impels 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to impede appellants’ freedom of 
worship?  What overbalancing need is so weighty in the constitutional scale 
that it justifies this substantial, though indirect, limitation of appellants’ 
freedom?”155  The asserted interest is paltry: “It is the mere convenience of 
having everyone rest on the same day.”156  And hence, in Justice Brennan’s 
view, the plaintiffs should prevail. 
Justice Brennan’s important conceptual move in Braunfeld was employing 
a balancing test (framed as whether the interest is compelling) as a way to give 
meaning to Barnette’s stringent standard.157  And after 1962, when personnel 
changes on the Court cemented a majority with strong civil libertarian 
tendencies, Justice Brennan was increasingly in a position to stamp this 
perspective onto the Court’s caselaw. 
Justice Brennan’s coalitions applied the standard aggressively, and the First 
Amendment claimant prevailed in each instance.  These cases were not always 
precise or consistent in defining how closely the means chosen by the 
legislature had to fit the end in question.  Finally, in the 1963 free exercise case 
Sherbert v. Verner, Justice Brennan yoked the compelling state interest 
standard to narrow tailoring, operationalized as an LRM test.158  Even if the 
State had a compelling interest to condition unemployment benefits on a 
willingness to work on Saturdays, “it would plainly be incumbent upon [South 
 
 152 Id. at 611. 
 153 Id. at 612 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). 
 154 Id. at 613. 
 155 Id. at 613–14. 
 156 Id. at 614. 
 157 Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. 
 158 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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Carolina] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would [serve 
such interest] without infringing First Amendment rights.”159  The pairing of a 
compelling state interest test with narrow tailoring stuck.  Here was the mature 
strict scrutiny framework, which would come to be applied across a range of 
doctrinal areas in the coming years. 
Another example illustrates how the Court sometimes employed the 
compelling state interest standard as a vehicle for balancing interests in First 
Amendment cases during the 1960s.  Williams v. Rhodes concerned a freedom 
of association challenge to Ohio laws raising barriers for new parties to make it 
onto presidential election ballots in the state.160  Ohio advanced a number of 
state interests served by the statutes, but the Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Black, found that none of these “justifie[d] imposing such heavy burdens on 
the right.”161  Some of the State’s arguments were rejected because the 
tailoring of the means to the ends was not sufficiently tight.162  The Court also 
conceded that some of the State’s asserted interests—such as an interest in 
electing the candidate chosen by a majority of voters—would indeed be served 
by the laws.163  But the burdens on the right were too great to justify the 
benefit: 
[T]o grant the State power to keep all political parties off the ballot 
until they have enough members to win would stifle the growth of all 
new parties working to increase their strength from year to year.  
Considering these Ohio laws in their totality, this interest cannot 
justify the very severe restrictions on voting and associational rights 
which Ohio has imposed.164 
In subsequent years, of course, the strict scrutiny framework migrated into 
equal protection analysis and became a mainstay of constitutional rights review 
in that and other doctrinal areas.165  And it was in the course of this expansion 
from its First Amendment roots that strict scrutiny gained a reputation for 
unbending stringency—for being, in Gerald Gunther’s famous phrase, “fatal in 
 
 159 Id. at 407. 
 160 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
 161 Id. at 31.  The right to vote was also implicated, but the Court’s analysis of these two rights was the 
same. 
 162 For instance, the State argued that promoting a two-party system encouraged compromise and political 
stability.  But the Court noted that the measures did not just promote a two-party system; rather, they gave two 
particular parties a monopoly over citizens’ votes.  Id. at 31–32. 
 163 Id. at 32. 
 164 Id. 
 165 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down a one-
year waiting period for welfare-benefit eligibility on equal protection grounds). 
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fact.”166  The balancing of interests, undertaken openly in the context of the 
“compelling state interest” requirement in some early cases of the 1960s, was 
less apparent in the 1970s.167  More often, the Court would intensely scrutinize 
the tailoring of the statute, striking down legislation on the basis of its 
overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness, so as to avoid having to consider 
whether the interest at stake qualified as “compelling.”168 
C. Assessment 
We have shown that PA has analogues and antecedents in our own 
constitutional history, both in dormant Commerce Clause and strict scrutiny.  
Strikingly, the evolution of rights review in the United States parallels 
developments in Germany.169  In both countries, judicial efforts to protect 
individual liberties passed through two distinct phases.170  In the late 
nineteenth century in Germany, as in the United States, courts devised 
techniques to test state encroachments on private freedoms that set standards 
for both the ends and means of government power.171  In Germany, the target 
of judicial scrutiny was administrative action, not legislation, and the courts 
were specialized administrative tribunals, the first of which was created in 
1875.172  In the famous Kreuzberg decision of 1882, the Prussian higher 
administrative court circumscribed the reach of the police power: it only 
authorized measures to promote public safety—as opposed to, say, 
aesthetics.173  That same decade, the court also began imposing an LRM test on 
 
 166 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
 167 See Rubin, supra note 120, at 4 (“In the courts, strict scrutiny is essentially invoked, not employed.  
Despite its name—strict ‘scrutiny’—it ordinarily amounts to a finding of invalidity, not a tool of analysis.”). 
 168 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), illustrates the point.  In this case, 
Massachusetts advanced an interest in protecting shareholders to support its ban on corporate contributions to 
political campaigns.  Id. at 766.  But the Court found the statute both overinclusive and underinclusive with 
respect to those interests.  Id. at 793.  The Court “[a]ssum[ed], arguendo, that protection of shareholders is a 
‘compelling’ interest under the circumstances of this case,” and struck down the statute for lack of a 
“substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest” and the right to free speech.  Id. at 795 
(quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960)). 
 169 These events are described in some detail in our previous article.  See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra 
note 5, at 97–111. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 100–02. 
 172 Id. at 100. 
 173 In Kreuzberg, the court struck down a regulation by the Berlin police that restricted the heights of 
buildings in order to afford a view of a military monument.  Preußisches Oberverwaltungsgericht [PrOVG] 
[Prussian Higher Administrative Court] July 14, 1882, 9 Entscheidungen des preußischen 
Oberverwaltungsgerichts [PrOVGE] 353, reprinted in 100 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 219 (1985). 
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administrative actions that curtailed private freedoms.174  While Germany’s 
courts lacked the capacity for constitutional review of statutes, it is striking that 
the techniques they derived so closely resemble those applied by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in cases like Lawton v. Steele and the dormant Commerce 
Clause cases.175 
There are similarities between the second phases of each country’s judicial 
efforts to protect individual liberties as well.  Starting in the 1950s, Germany’s 
Constitutional Court, like the United States Supreme Court, began 
experimenting with techniques to give heightened protection to rights of 
constitutional stature.176  An early form of proportionality analysis appeared in 
a 1958 case, Apothekenurteil, as discussed in Part III below.  PA built on the 
LRM test that had been pioneered decades earlier, but strengthened the 
protection for rights by adding a balancing component.177  The balancing step 
ensured validation of even narrowly tailored measures only if their benefit 
exceeded their cost in terms of rights infringement.178  The eighteenth-century 
natural law scholars who originally conceptualized PA insisted upon this 
balancing stage, as did constitutional law scholars in the 1950s.179  Once 
formalized in subsequent cases, the PA framework quickly became a fixture of 
German constitutional law, spreading into a number of different rights areas in 
the 1960s.180 
These similar stages of development, in the face of the manifold legal and 
political differences between Germany and the United States, testify to the 
powerful, functional imperatives that modern courts face to manage tensions 
between important values.  And they suggest that PA offers real advantages to 
courts in that position.181  In both systems, when tasked with protecting rights 
 
 174 For instance, in an 1886 case, the court ruled that the police could not require, on public safety 
grounds, a landowner to remove a post erected at the edge of his property.  Rather, all that was necessary to 
protect the public was requiring the landowner to light the post after dark.  As the court explained, “The 
protection from accidents . . . is indeed the task of the police; this task and the authority finds its limit, 
however, in that the chosen measures may not extend farther than they must to meet the goal of eliminating the 
danger.”  PrOVG July 3, 1886, 13 PrOVGE 426, 427. 
 175 See supra Part I.A. 
 176 See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 5, at 104–11. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 107–08. 
 179 Id. at 99, 108–09. 
 180 Id. at 109–10. 
 181 Nor should the parallels obscure important differences in the scope of review.  Most importantly, in 
nineteenth-century Germany, judicial scrutiny was only applied against administrative action, not legislation, 
and in the twentieth century, proportionality persisted as an administrative doctrine even as it gained new life 
in constitutional law.  Id. at 97–111. 
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against interventionist states in a manner suitable for modern liberal polities, 
courts came up with similar formulas that combine LRM testing and balancing.  
The attractiveness of proportionality-based doctrinal frameworks is 
understandable.  They enable judges to protect rights at a high level without 
proclaiming any right to be absolute, in light of all important, contextual 
factors.  Further, they accommodate judges with different views on the merits 
of particular disputes.  PA channels disagreements on the merits into the 
substantive issues that matter most: whether measures are narrowly tailored, 
and whether the state’s asserted interest is sufficiently compelling to curtail a 
right. 
The development toward convergence in the 1960s also casts the 
subsequent divergence between the United States and Germany in another 
light.  Why did strict scrutiny in the United States gain the reputation as a rigid 
test, and new tiers of analysis evolve to handle different legal questions,182 
while in Germany, PA came to be accepted as an all-purpose technique for 
adjudicating constitutional rights?  Our response is threefold. 
First, when strict scrutiny spread into equal protection, the “suspect class 
case” quickly became the paradigmatic application for strict scrutiny.183  But in 
that context, and particularly in cases involving racial discrimination, the strict 
scrutiny test assumed a different purpose.  The intensive scrutiny on the 
connection between the means chosen and the state’s asserted interests was 
intended to “smok[e] out” invidious purposes—to test the state’s good faith.184  
While the narrow tailoring requirement serves this purpose well, this use of the 
test tended to obscure its suitability for a balancing analysis.  Second, the 
dominance of a liberal majority on the Court during the period in which strict 
scrutiny emerged helped to cement the idea, on the Court and in the legal 
academy, that state measures virtually always failed under strict scrutiny.  This 
empirical regularity appears to have shaped the Court’s own conception of how 
strict scrutiny operates, so that the framework was defined more by an outcome 
than by the technique.185  At a deeper level, the predictability of outcomes 
under strict scrutiny may have promoted a particular—absolutist—conception 
 
 182 See infra Part III. 
 183 See Siegel, supra note 42, at 398–99.  As Siegel points out, the Court was slow to apply the 
compelling state interest test in racial discrimination cases because the narrow tailoring inquiry was sufficient 
to ferret out illicit motives. 
 184 See Fallon, supra note 3, at 1308–11; see also Rubenfeld, supra note 26, at 428. 
 185 As has been noted, however, strict scrutiny is by no means always “fatal in fact.”  See Winkler, supra 
note 44.  Winkler’s article does not cover cases before 1990, and no one has yet demonstrated how fatal strict 
scrutiny in fact was during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. 
MATHEWS&SWEET GALLEYSFINAL  5/26/2011  8:59 AM 
836 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60 
of rights.  The rights-protecting majorities that applied strict scrutiny contained 
Justices who viewed some rights, at least, as trumps that admitted no 
infringement.186  Although this view was never endorsed by a majority of the 
Court, the outcomes of cases employing strict scrutiny appear to have subtly 
reinforced the underlying conception of absolutists. 
Third, the retreat from open balancing in strict scrutiny reflects the Court’s 
attempt to protect itself from exposure as a law-making body.  This motivation 
is not without its ironies.  An open balancing of the relevant interests usurps 
the role of the legislator far less than the kind of probing 
underinclusiveness/overinclusiveness analysis that the Court undertook in 
Bellotti.187  And if the alternative to a principled balancing is the elaboration of 
constitutional rules as the basis for its decision, a court cannot hide from law 
making.  The court that constructs a constitutional code—that derives a rule for 
every occasion—makes itself not only a lawmaker, but a supreme, 
constitutional lawmaker. 
III.  PATHOLOGIES OF TIERED REVIEW 
We now shift focus from the past development of rights-review 
frameworks to the present state of rights doctrine, focusing on tiered review.  
The contemporary tiered review regime is the heir to the developments 
discussed in Part II.B.  As the strict scrutiny framework gained its reputation as 
“fatal in fact,” bifurcated review splintered, and the Court improvised new 
forms of less stringent review to handle new classes of claims.  Canonically, 
the Supreme Court employs three tiers of review: rational basis review, 
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.  But even counting the tiers is no 
easy matter.  Some commentators have identified apparent deviations from 
these standards as establishing new tiers, such as “minimal scrutiny with bite” 
for laws directed at “quasi-suspect” classes,188 and others have construed 
inconsistencies in how the standards are applied as evidence that the whole 
edifice of tiered review is beginning to crumble.189  In any case, the set of 
 
 186 As noted above, Justices Black and Douglas, who took this view of rights, originally declined to join 
opinions applying strict scrutiny, but did in time.  See supra text accompanying note 50. 
 187 See supra note 168. 
 188 See, e.g., JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: ILLUSION AND REALITY 81–84 
(2001) (discussing how the Court upgraded minimal scrutiny in certain contexts beginning in the 1970s). 
 189 See Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 
946 (2004) (“The flaccidity of the strict scrutiny employed in Grutter, coupled with the robust skepticism of 
the minimal scrutiny employed in Lawrence, suggests that the neat compartments of tiered scrutiny are 
beginning to collapse.”). 
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standards that together make up tiered review is our closest functional 
analogue to proportionality: a general rubric for reviewing rights claims in 
multiple substantive areas.  But, we argue, there are serious pathologies 
associated with tiered review, including: (A) judicial abdication, in the form of 
rational basis review; (B) analytical incompleteness, in the absence of an 
explicit balancing stage; and (C) doctrinal instability.  Compared to PA, each 
of these pathologies threatens rights protection in fundamental ways. 
The discussion brings to light a peculiar and persistent dynamic in the 
evolution of our doctrinal standards.  Elements of proportionality are scattered 
throughout American rights doctrines; indeed, as we will show, even rational 
basis review, as conducted until the mid-1950s, had affinities with classic 
PA.190  Over time, though, the Court worked to shut down the interest 
balancing internal to these standards, such that the outcome of rational basis 
review, and strict scrutiny, became practically a foregone conclusion.191  Faced 
with this rigidity, the Court has brought balancing back in, often in the form of 
a new ad hoc standard or test. 
A. Abdication 
Judges who use the proportionality framework typically begin by 
discussing the nature, scope, and purpose of the pleaded right—first in the 
abstract, then with reference to the claimant and the conflict between the right 
and another constitutional value, such as that pleaded by the government.192  
When balancing under PA, the court typically considers how much of the 
“essence” of the right is implicated in any dispute: the greater the incursion 
into the essential core of a right, the weightier the public interest invoked by 
the government must be to justify the incursion.  Thus, a court may recognize 
that an individual’s wish to consume child pornography falls within the rubric 
of free expression, while permitting the government to regulate the harms that 
result from the sexual exploitation of children, including to criminalize the 
possession of such pornography.193  That same court might also consider 
 
 190 See infra Part III.A. 
 191 See supra note 185. 
 192 See supra Part I. 
 193 In a leading child pornography case, R. v. Sharpe, the Canadian Supreme Court held that a provision of 
the Criminal Code, as applied to Mr. Sharpe, violated his freedom of expression but was justified as a 
proportional measure designed to protect children from exploitation.  [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45.  The approach thus 
contrasts with categorical, rule-based approaches to rights protection that seek to dispense with balancing once 
the nature and scope of the right have been defined.  In this latter approach, a court might decide that Mr. 
Sharpe’s rights were not abridged, since child pornography is not a protected form of expression, per se.  Id.; 
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political protest to be presumptively protected from state regulation.  Only a 
small sliver of the right to free expression is implicated in child pornography, 
whereas the value of political speech constitutes part of the essential core of 
that freedom.  The multistage proportionality framework facilitates the task of 
developing such distinctions in a principled, relatively transparent manner. 
In contrast, as presently deployed, rational basis review leads American 
judges to abdicate their duty to protect rights, including property rights, that 
are expressly provided for by the Constitution.  The underlying doctrinal 
justification for abdication is unclear: either the claimed “right” is, in fact, not 
a right; or the right is not important enough to deserve the judicial protection 
afforded to “fundamental” rights; or, through balancing, the Court has 
determined that the right can never outweigh any reasonable public purpose 
legitimately pursued by the government.  Further, the Supreme Court often 
portrays and uses rational basis as a kind of deference doctrine—it covers 
policy domains in which legislators, not courts, are to do the balancing.  As 
regards property rights, the Court traded one rigid position (aggressive 
protection of property in the Lochner era) for another (abdication in the post-
Lochner era).  We think it is a bad strategic move for the Court, or any rights-
protecting court, to treat a rights provision as either de facto absolute or de 
facto without force.  It is also indefensible, as a formal matter, to excise a right 
from the Constitution, yet that is what the Court has done.194 
A telling example is the well-known 1955 Supreme Court decision 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.195  The case involved an 
Oklahoma statute that would have forbade opticians (who grind and duplicate 
lenses, and fit them to frames and faces) from selling their services and 
products without the prior authorization of either an ophthalmologist (a 
medical doctor specializing in eye care) or an optometrist (a licensed 
professional who diagnoses but does not treat eye disease, and who writes 
prescriptions for lenses).196  Among other things, the law would have 
prohibited opticians from replacing old with new frames, or from duplicating 
existing lenses to insert into old frames, without the customer first obtaining a 
 
cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding that child pornography is beyond the limits of First 
Amendment protection). 
 194 We are not the first to take this view.  See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER 
RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985). 
 195 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 196 Id. at 485–86. 
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prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist.197  Ophthalmologists and 
optometrists would also possess the authority to designate which optician a 
customer could use.198  Days before the law was to enter into force, opticians 
asked a three-judge federal district court to strike it down on the grounds that 
the reform would violate property rights guaranteed by the Constitution.199  
The plaintiffs also claimed that the statute comprised an illegal delegation, to 
private parties, of the authority to determine who would do business as a 
dispensing optician in the state.200  Oklahoma claimed that the statute was 
designed to promote better eye care, not least by increasing the frequency of 
eye exams.201 
After extensive testimony, the district court found that the effect of the law 
would be to put many opticians out of business202—a total deprivation of 
rights—while providing no added benefit to public health.203  Under PA, such 
findings can only lead to one result: the invalidation of the law as a 
disproportionate exercise of legislative power.  Judge Wallace, writing for the 
court, recognized that the dispute was to be resolved under a rationality 
standard.204  But he did not regard rational basis as a strict deference standard 
that would insulate the statute from judicial review of the rights claim.  Instead, 
Judge Wallace understood rational basis to require verification that the state 
had not abridged the rights of the opticians in an arbitrary205 or unreasonable206 
manner: 
 
 197 Id. at 485. 
 198 Id. at 485 n.1. 
 199 Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 137 (W.D. Okla. 1954), rev’d, 348 U.S. 
483 (1955). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487. 
 202 Lee Optical, 120 F. Supp. at 144 n.37 (“The inevitable result of the enforcement of the provisions 
found by this Court unconstitutional . . . will be to literally put said plaintiffs out of business . . . .”). 
 203 Id. at 135 (“The evidence indicates, almost without variance, that written prescriptions issued by the 
professional examiner contain no directive data in regard to the manner in which the spectacles are to be fitted 
to the face of the wearer.  In addition, the Court is satisfied that the mere fitting of frames to the face, where 
the old lenses are available, is in reality only an incident to what fundamentally is a merchandising transaction, 
that is, the sale of a pair of frames; and, in any event, the knowledge necessary to perform these services is 
strictly artisan in character and can skillfully and accurately be performed without the professional knowledge 
and training essential to qualify as a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist.”). 
 204 Id. at 132–33. 
 205 Id. at 142 (“The dispensing optician, a merchant in this particular, cannot arbitrarily be divested of a 
substantial portion of his business upon the pretext that such a deprivation is rationally related to the public 
health.”). 
 206 Id. at 137–38 n.21 (“The action by the legislature in the instant act is as unreasonable as if pharmicists 
[sic] were divested of their right to do business by legislative action which delegated to physicians the absolute 
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It is recognized . . . that all legislative enactments are 
accompanied by a presumption of constitutionality; and, that the 
court must not by decision invalidate an enactment merely because in 
the court’s opinion the legislature acted unwisely.  Likewise, where 
the statute touches upon the public health and welfare, the statute 
cannot be deemed unconstitutional class legislation, even though a 
specific class of persons or businesses is singled out, where the 
legislation in its impact is free of caprice and discrimination and is 
rationally related to the public good.  A court only can annul 
legislative action where it appears certain that the attempted exercise 
of police power is arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory.207 
In this passage, Judge Wallace took pains to distinguish his approach from the 
kind of robotic formalism that had so discredited “reasonableness” review 
during the so-called Lochner era.  His opinion incorporated elements of PA 
into its analysis.  Citing what he considered stable precedent, Judge Wallace 
concluded that the state’s exercise of police powers would be justified only if 
the state could show, “[f]irst, that the interests of the public generally, as 
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, 
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the 
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.”208  He then disposed of 
the case in ways that anyone versed in PA would find familiar209: 
The means chosen by the legislature does not bear “a real and 
substantial relation” to the end sought, that is, better vision, inasmuch 
as . . . [ophthalmologists and optometrists] possess no knowledge or 
skill superior to a qualified practicing optician . . . and in fact 
[ophthalmologists and optometrists], as a class, are not as well 
 
control and responsibility for accurate compounding of medical prescriptions for the reason that a physician 
alone is qualified to prescribe drugs for patients.”). 
 207 Id. at 132. 
 208 Id. at 137 (emphasis added) (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)). 
 209 Concurring with this portion of the decision, Judge Murrah’s opinion also has the feel of a standard 
proportionality analysis: 
The obvious result of this legislation is to appropriate a property right of one class to follow a 
legitimate calling or occupation and to give it to another class not shown to be more competent in 
the public interest.  Indeed, the evidence shows that it would be inimical to the public interest to 
require the wearer of eye glasses to return to the ophthalmologist in order to obtain a prescription 
for the replacement or duplication of an eye glass, or to place the burden upon the 
ophthalmologist of merchandising frames and mountings and other appliances, or placing that 
purely commercial monopoly in the optometrist.  There is no rational basis for depriving the 
optician of the right to perform this purely mechanical and commercial service to the public. 
Id. at 144 (Murrah, J., dissenting in part) (dissenting on provisions affecting advertising, which we do not 
discuss here). 
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qualified as opticians as a class to either supervise or perform the 
services here regulated.210 
The district court held that three provisions of the Oklahoma statute violated 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that one provision 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of that same Amendment. 
It is crucial to stress that the district court did not find elements of PA alien 
or inimical to rational basis review.  As we found with respect to earlier 
versions of strict scrutiny,211 American judges considered necessity analysis 
and balancing to be inherent parts of the judicial repertoire when they 
adjudicated rights. 
The Supreme Court overturned the district court’s (much more nuanced) 
decision without so much as a single word concerning the rights being pleaded, 
and without serious consideration of facts or policy.  Instead, Justice Douglas, 
writing for a unanimous Court, simply abdicated: 
The Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in 
many cases.  But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the 
advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement. . . .  It is 
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might 
be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way 
to correct it. 
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of 
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, 
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.  
We emphasize again what Chief Justice Waite said in Munn v. 
Illinois, “For protection against abuses by legislatures the people 
must resort to the polls, not to the courts.”212 
Abdication also entailed an extraordinary act of constitutional law making: the 
Supreme Court rewrote the U.S. Constitution so as to deprive individuals of 
the judicial protection of rights expressly guaranteed by that same 
Constitution.213  Arguably, this decision is one of the most poorly reasoned by 
 
 210 Id. at 138. 
 211 See supra Part II. 
 212 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 497–88 (1955) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877)). 
 213 Justice Field’s dissent from Munn v. Illinois, which Justice Douglas cites as authority, applies equally 
well to Lee Optical: 
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the Court in an important case.  Indeed, it contains virtually no rights reasoning 
whatsoever.214 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Lee Optical and its enduring effects deserve 
to be considered in light of what the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(GFCC) was doing at the same time.  In Apothekenurteil,215 one of its earliest 
balancing cases, in 1958, a druggist challenged a Bavarian law regulating 
drugstores on the ground that it violated Article 12(1) of the Basic Law,216 
which provides for occupational freedom.  The law authorized the licensing of 
new pharmacies only when “in the public interest” and only when new stores 
would not destabilize the market by threatening the viability of existing 
pharmacies.217  In framing its analysis, the GFCC squarely confronted the 
tension between individual rights and public goals, which led it to embrace 
balancing: 
The constitutional right should protect the freedom of the 
individual; the professional regulation should ensure sufficient 
protection of societal interests.  The individual’s claim to freedom 
has a stronger effect . . . the more his right to free choice of a 
profession is put into question; the protection of the public becomes 
more urgent, the greater the disadvantages are, that come from the 
free practicing of professions.  When one seeks to maximize 
 
The construction actually given by . . . this court makes the provision, in the language of Taney, a 
protection to “a mere barren and abstract right, without any practical operation upon the business 
of life,” and renders it “illusive and nugatory, mere words of form, affording no protection and 
producing no practical result.” 
94 U.S. 113, 145 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 318 (1843)). 
 214 With respect to the equal protection claim, Justice Douglas had only this to say: 
The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition.  
Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different 
remedies.  Or so the legislature may think.  Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing 
itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.  The legislature 
may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.  The 
prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination.  We 
cannot say that that point has been reached here. 
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 489 (citations omitted). 
 215 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 11, 1958, 7 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 377 (Ger.). 
 216 Article 12(1) states, “All Germans shall have the right freely to choose their occupation or profession, 
their place of work and their place of training.  The practice of an occupation or profession may be regulated 
by or pursuant to a law.”  GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] 
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 12(1) (Ger.). 
 217 7 BVERFGE 377 (380). 
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both . . . equally legitimate . . . demands in the most effective way, 
then the solution can only lie in a careful balancing [Abwägung] of 
the meaning of the two opposed and perhaps conflicting interests.218 
In a rich and complex decision, the court then elaborated an early version of 
PA, tailored to the specifics of Article 12(1),219 and annulled the law on 
necessity grounds.  In a case decided the next year, the German Court 
dismissed claims under Article 12(1), upholding a law that prohibited 
businesses other than licensed pharmacies from selling prepackaged, 
nonprescription drugs at retail.220  It held that public health would be better 
served if all drugs were sold by trained professionals, and that pharmacies 
would be economically imperiled if they could no longer rely on this stream of 
income.221 
The German Court did not use these cases to lay a procrustean bed that 
would then force every set of facts to the same result.  On the contrary, it 
developed a flexible balancing framework capable of adaptation to changing 
circumstances.  While balancing may lead to inconsistent outcomes (a 
functional economic argument is rejected in the first case but accepted in the 
second, if on different facts222), the GFCC did not abdicate its constitutional 
duties.  Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the GFCC (a new jurisdiction whose 
political legitimacy remained to be tested) did not tell rights claimants: “go to 
the polls, not the courts.”  Rather, it fully accepted the responsibility that 
attends the power of judicial review.  Taking a wider perspective, the German 
Court’s commitment to proportionality balancing has helped it avoid the kinds 
of problems that the U.S. Supreme Court created for itself.  In the pre-New 
Deal era, the American Court committed itself to defending freedom of 
contract and laissez-faire capitalism against market regulation, as if that 
defense was one of its central institutional missions; it then abandoned 
property rights altogether.  In contrast, the German Court has consistently held 
that the Basic Law is “neutral” with respect to the kind of economic system or 
 
 218 7 BVERFGE 377 (404–05). 
 219 7 BVERFGE 377 (396–12).  The case was decided before the GFCC had fully developed the 
proportionality principle.  Today there is one proportionality test for all fundamental rights.  Stone Sweet & 
Mathews, supra note 5, at 110–11. 
 220 BVerfG Jan. 7, 1959, 9 BVERFGE 73 (82). 
 221 9 BVerfGE 73 (76–81). 
 222 See Paul G. Kauper, The Constitutions of West Germany and the United States: A Comparative Study, 
58 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1130 (1960). 
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regulation fashioned by the legislator.223  Yet, that position has never entailed 
abdication.224  On the contrary, one of the major responsibilities of the GFCC 
has been to define the reciprocal limits of market regulation and property 
rights225 as German society and the economy have evolved.  While doing so, it 
has sometimes angered the Christian Democratic Right, sometimes the Social 
Democratic Left, but it has never, over more than five decades, lost its 
centrality to economic governance.  The German Court would have failed, as 
did the American Supreme Court, had it embraced rigidity and absolutism. 
B. Incompleteness 
From the perspective of a judge who systematically uses PA to manage 
rights litigation, the Supreme Court’s use of variegated approaches can at times 
seem casual or worse—unprincipled.  The American judge is much more 
comfortable omitting analytical steps that the PA judge would view as 
essential.  The PA judge always begins with a general discussion of the right 
being pleaded as a matter of constitutional structure or theory, and in light of 
past rulings.  Once a right has been so constructed, the judge then turns to PA.  
If the government measure under review survives necessity analysis, then the 
balancing-in-the-strict-sense stage will allow the judge to ensure that the law 
does not infringe too much on the right, given the polity’s constitutional 
commitments.  The judge thus begins with a relatively abstract construction of 
the right and ends with analysis of the right in a specific conflict with an 
opposing value.  The American judge may leave out one or both of these steps, 
even in strict scrutiny, as when the judge performs the compelling interest 
inquiry without serious consideration of the right, or balancing. 
 
 223 The leading decision is the Investment Aid I case, BVerfG July 20, 1959, 4 BVERFGE 7.  A translation 
and commentary can be found in KOMMERS, supra note 21, at 243–45. 
 224 The GFCC seeks to reduce, as much as possible, the tension between the pleaded property right and 
the public good resulting from a limitation of property rights; that is, the GFCC balances among contending 
constitutional values in light of the context of the case.  In cases like Lee Optical, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
little use for either the Constitution or context.  For a superb comparison of German and American approaches 
to property rights as constitutional rights, see Gregory S. Alexander, Property as a Fundamental 
Constitutional Right? The German Example, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (2003). 
 225 The Basic Law provides for the right to property in Article 14, which qualifies the right to property in 
a manner that strongly implies the use of PA.  GG art. 14 (“(1) Property and the right of inheritance shall be 
guaranteed.  Their content and limits shall be defined by the laws.  (2) Property entails obligations.  Its use 
shall also serve the public good.  (3) Expropriation shall only be permissible for the public good.  It may only 
be ordered by or pursuant to a law that determines the nature and extent of compensation.  Such compensation 
shall be determined by establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those 
affected.  In case of dispute concerning the amount of compensation, recourse may be had to the ordinary 
courts.”). 
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A well-known example of egregious incompleteness is United States v. 
O’Brien.226  Mr. O’Brien had burned his draft card, in violation of federal 
statutes, while protesting the Vietnam War and military conscription.227  
Although the case raised important questions about the government’s use of a 
statutory amendment to stifle protest,228 our focus here is on the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of the right to “wordless” or “symbolic” speech.  The Court 
mentioned but took no firm position on the question of whether O’Brien’s act 
was to be considered “speech” under the First Amendment—the inquiry was 
simply left incomplete.229  Instead, the Court formulated the following test: 
This Court has held that when “speech” and “nonspeech” elements 
are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important 
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify 
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.  To characterize 
the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court 
has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; 
subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong.  Whatever imprecision 
inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regulation 
is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the 
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance 
of that interest.230 
The Court did not distinguish a “compelling interest” from a “substantial 
interest”; on the contrary, it was implied that the “descriptive terms” listed 
were broadly synonymous.  On the basis of this test, the Court upheld 
O’Brien’s conviction, since the draft card fulfilled a variety of administrative 
functions, such as communicating the rights and duties of the bearer.231 
 
 226 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 227 See id. at 369–70, 376. 
 228 In 1965, Congress adopted an amendment to the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948 
in part to deter those who would burn their draft cards in protest of the war.  See id. at 370, 385–86.  The 
circuit court, noting that O’Brien’s action was already punishable under a separate regulation, declared the 
amendment unconstitutional on the grounds that it was expressly designed to limit speech.  O’Brien v. United 
States, 376 F.2d 538, 540–41 (1st Cir. 1967), vacated, 391 U.S. 367. 
 229 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of 
conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an 
idea.  However, even on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O’Brien’s conduct is 
sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a 
registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity.”). 
 230 Id. at 376–77 (footnotes omitted). 
 231 Id. at 378–80, 382. 
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The judgment concluded in deafening silence on the question of whether 
the government’s interest did or did not outweigh O’Brien’s “alleged” speech 
right—the answer to which one might have learned if the framework contained 
a balancing-in-the-strict-sense phase.  The Court might also have balanced the 
contending values in its discussion of the nature of the government’s 
“important or significant” interest; instead it marched through the test while 
saying nothing of any importance about speech.  To resolve such a case under 
a standard version of PA, the Court would have been required to consider the 
nature and scope of the right at play upfront, and then to ensure that the right 
did not get lost in the analysis of the government’s position at the end. 
O’Brien may illustrate something else about American rights review.  As 
we mentioned, O’Brien did not subscribe to the literal strict scrutiny formula of 
“compelling” state interest; a “substantial” or “important” government interest 
would do.232  This position is subject to different interpretations.  Some might 
view O’Brien as a strict scrutiny case in all but name; others might reject this 
conclusion, especially in light of the result—the government wins.233  But if 
O’Brien is not a strict scrutiny case, what is it? 
O’Brien may well be a forerunner of the intermediate scrutiny tests that 
would proliferate starting in the 1970s.234  Like the standard in O’Brien, the 
canonical intermediate scrutiny test also requires an “important” state interest 
(although it does not impose a narrow tailoring test).235  To the extent that we 
regard the O’Brien standard as an early intermediate scrutiny test, the case 
follows another pattern.  As with the strict scrutiny framework, we see the 
Court undertaking a doctrinal innovation with respect to the vanguard of civil 
liberties—First Amendment rights—which in short order spreads to other 
constitutional rights.  We discuss the creation of intermediate forms of scrutiny 
immediately below. 
C. Instability 
The third pathology is related to the first two.  In the classic “bifurcated 
review” regime, judges are asked to sort cases into two bins that represent 
 
 232 See id. at 366–67. 
 233 See id. at 386. 
 234 Kathleen Sullivan, for one, views the O’Brien test as a version of intermediate scrutiny.  Sullivan, 
supra note 8, at 297. 
 235 For example, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), discussed in Part III.C.1 infra.  Instead of 
narrow tailoring, the test required a “substantial” relation between the policy and the government’s objectives, 
again echoing O’Brien’s language.  See id. 
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extremes of stringency and deference.236  The inadequacy of these options 
generates a persistent instability in the doctrinal structure.  Time and again, the 
Court has introduced an intermediate standard of review to govern its inquiry 
in different areas of law.237  Forms of intermediate review represent efforts to 
make a space for balancing in the context of rights review.  As such, they are 
also symptomatic of the dysfunctionality of classic two-tiered review. 
But the ad hoc introduction of new standards of review does not “solve the 
problem” of two-tiered review; rather, it creates new problems.  For all its 
faults, the two-tiered framework of review was at least rooted in a coherent 
distinction between economic liberties and “preferred” fundamental rights.238  
Adding new tiers registers as a deviation from this baseline and may come 
across as an unprincipled or illegitimate move.  The dissenting opinions in the 
cases that first adopt intermediate scrutiny reliably paint them in this light.239 
More generally, defections from bifurcated review undermine the stability 
of rights adjudication.  Because we have no meta-theory of rights that maps 
certain classes of claims into standards of review, confusion and contention 
over the proper standard are common, particularly when new rights claims 
arise.  The unpredictability and instability of tiered review are partly to blame 
for the fact that so much of the analytic firepower in our constitutional caselaw 
is aimed at the standard of review, rather than the substance of the claim.240 
We illustrate these points by looking at cases where courts elaborate new 
standards of review in an attempt to introduce some balancing into the 
analysis.  We first discuss two developments well-known to students of 
constitutional law: the Supreme Court’s changing approach to sex 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, and Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey’s revisions to the Roe v. Wade framework 
 
 236 See White, supra note 119, at 301 (describing the Court’s “bifurcated review project”). 
 237 Also, on occasion the Court has claimed to be applying one of the two canonical standards, but 
transparently not done so.  See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) 
(recognizing that a law discriminating against mentally retarded individuals does not merit heightened scrutiny 
because mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect class, but finding that the law fails to rationally relate to any 
of its various justifications, suggesting that the Court was actually applying a higher standard than rational 
basis review). 
 238 See Gillman, supra note 82, at 623–26; White, supra note 119, at 309. 
 239 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 244 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s 
application of intermediate scrutiny to a statute that deprives illegal alien children of the right to public 
education); Craig, 429 U.S. at 220–21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s application of 
intermediate scrutiny to a law that imposes different drinking ages for men and women). 
 240 See White, supra note 43, at 82–83. 
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for abortion rights.  Our treatment of these exhaustively studied developments 
is brisk and focuses on the shifts in doctrine.  We also consider in some detail a 
lesser known federal appeals court case, involving a constitutional challenge to 
a local juvenile curfew.  This case shows a court trying to fit a new 
classification into the existing tiers, and the difficulties and conflicts that 
ensue.241  We pair familiar and unfamiliar cases deliberately, to underscore the 
pervasiveness of the difficulties with tiered review.242 
1. Sex Equality and Equal Protection 
The equal protection jurisprudence of sex classifications has famously 
followed a meandering course.  The Supreme Court originally subjected sex 
classifications to rational basis review, then increased the scrutiny without 
formally changing the standard, even flirting with full suspect classification 
status before devising a new standard of intermediate scrutiny.  Then, in time, 
the intermediate scrutiny standard drifted upward to become more stringent.  
From a comparative perspective, one cause of this well-known evolution seems 
clear.  The inherited two-tier framework offered the Court no opportunity to 
measure the harms of gender distinctions against their benefits, and the Court 
has struggled ever since to find a workable formula for doing so. 
In the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court subjected sex 
classifications to rational basis review and often upheld them.243  As traditional 
attitudes about gender roles began to fade, it became apparent that rational 
basis review provided women with no meaningful guarantee to equal 
protection of the laws.244  In Reed v. Reed, Chief Justice Burger, writing for a 
unanimous Court, struck down an Idaho law giving preference to men in estate 
administration, ostensibly on a rational basis standard.245  But the opinion 
 
 241 Another line of prominent cases in which the Court shifts the standard of review, with dramatic results, 
includes Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (applying intermediate scrutiny to affirmative 
action policies in broadcasting), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict 
scrutiny to affirmative action policy in federal contracting program). 
 242 Tiered review is also a pervasive feature of state constitutional doctrine, which space prevents us from 
discussing in this Article.  Notably, states have also been at the forefront of experimenting with rights review, 
and some have opted out of tiered review of their constitutional claims.  See Goldberg, supra note 10, at 522 
n.154. 
 243 See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding a Florida law that disallowed women from 
being selected for jury service unless they volunteered); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a 
Michigan law that banned certain women from serving as bartenders). 
 244 In Goesaert, for instance, the Court held that Michigan had a rational basis for banning women, except 
the wives or daughters of male bar owners, from tending bars.  335 U.S. at 466–67. 
 245 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971). 
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lacked the characteristic deference to legislative judgments that is associated 
with rational basis review.  The state’s justification for the preference was to 
avoid controversy when more than one person applied to administer the will.246  
The Court dismissed the rationale summarily, criticizing the policy as “the 
very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”247  The Court added, without further 
explanation, that “whatever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding 
intrafamily controversy, the choice in this context may not lawfully be 
mandated solely on the basis of sex.”248  Even as Reed pledged allegiance to 
rational basis review, it marked a sharp sub silentio departure from it. 
The Reed approach did not long endure, however.  Two years later, in 
Frontiero v. Richardson, a plurality of the Court pushed to shift gender from 
rational basis review into strict scrutiny by claiming gender as a suspect 
classification.249  The dispute in Frontiero concerned a federal policy that 
made it easier for male military personnel than for female military personnel to 
claim their spouses as dependents for benefits purposes.250  The appropriate 
standard of review for gender-based restrictions became the focal point of the 
case and fractured the Court. 
The proposition that sex classifications should be subjected to strict 
scrutiny found only four votes: Justice Brennan was joined by Justices 
Douglas, White, and Marshall.251  Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun 
and Chief Justice Burger, wrote an opinion that reached the same result on the 
authority of Reed without elevating sex classifications to suspect status.252  The 
concurrence declined to decide whether sex was a suspect class because the 
statute failed even under the lesser measure of Reed-style rational basis 
review.253 
 
 246 Id. at 76. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. at 76–77. 
 249 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973). 
 250 Id. at 678–79. 
 251 Id. at 678. 
 252 Id. at 691–92 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 253 See id. at 692.  The Powell concurrence also argued that for the Court to decide the issue, it would 
effectively preempt democratic deliberations on precisely this issue, as the Equal Rights Amendment was then 
under consideration, and would have the effect of making sex a suspect classification.  Id.  Justice Stewart 
concurred separately, and Justice Rehnquist dissented, adopting the opinion of the district court.  Id. at 691. 
MATHEWS&SWEET GALLEYSFINAL  5/26/2011  8:59 AM 
850 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60 
The status of sex classifications in equal protection analysis reached an 
equilibrium of sorts in 1976 with Craig v. Boren.254  Reed and Frontiero had 
demonstrated that no majority of the Court was satisfied with analyzing sex 
classifications under rational basis review, and no majority was willing to 
apply strict scrutiny.  In Craig, the Court resolved this impasse by creating a 
new option: an intermediate standard of review for classifications relating to 
sex. 
The case concerned an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of low-
alcohol beer to women younger than age eighteen, and to men younger than 
age twenty-one.255  Writing for a bare majority, Justice Brennan articulated a 
new standard of review for gender distinctions as a distillation of recent 
practice.  Citing to Reed, Frontiero, and other cases, he wrote: “To withstand 
constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender 
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially 
related to achievement of those objectives.”256  The government objective 
asserted here was public safety, and the state had sought to demonstrate the 
statute’s fit with statistical evidence showing, most pertinently, that men ages 
eighteen to twenty were much more likely to be arrested for drunk driving than 
women of the same age.257  The Court concluded that this evidence was 
insufficient to establish the requisite substantial relation: only 2% of the men in 
this cohort were found to drive drunk, and penalizing them all was 
unjustified.258 
Justice Brennan’s intermediate standard in Craig won the support of a 
majority on the Court—and was applied in subsequent cases—but fewer than 
half of the Justices on the Craig Court endorsed the standard without 
reservation.  Justices Powell and Stevens both joined the opinion but wrote 
separately to express misgivings over the introduction of a new, intermediate 
standard for sex-based classifications.  Justice Powell candidly discussed the 
problems with two-tiered analysis and Reed’s divergence from traditional 
rational basis review, but he preferred proceeding under Reed’s nominal 
rational basis review to “a further subdividing of equal protection analysis.”259  
 
 254 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 255 Id. at 191–92. 
 256 Id. at 197. 
 257 Id. at 199–200. 
 258 Id. at 202. 
 259 Id. at 211 n.* (Powell, J., concurring). 
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Justice Stevens, for his part, challenged the value of the tiered analysis 
altogether.  He began: 
There is only one Equal Protection Clause.  It requires every 
State to govern impartially.  It does not direct the courts to apply one 
standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other 
cases.  Whatever criticism may be leveled at a judicial opinion 
implying that there are at least three such standards applies with the 
same force to a double standard.260 
In his own analysis of the statute, Justice Stevens emphasized the poorness of 
fit between the statute and the alleged purpose in his decision to strike it 
down.261 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented.  Justice Rehnquist in 
particular visited scorn on the creation of a new standard, emphasizing the 
arbitrariness and novelty of Justice Brennan’s formulation: 
The Court’s conclusion that a law which treats males less 
favorably than females “must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives” apparently comes out of thin air.  The Equal Protection 
Clause contains no such language, and none of our previous cases 
adopt that standard.  I would think we have had enough difficulty 
with the two standards of review which our cases have recognized—
the norm of “rational basis,” and the “compelling state interest” 
required where a “suspect classification” is involved—so as to 
counsel weightily against the insertion of still another “standard” 
between those two.262 
Justice Rehnquist also faulted the content of this standard—in particular, the 
qualifiers “important” and “substantial”—as not lending themselves to 
perspicuous judicial application.263  The dissent further faulted the majority for 
rejecting the statistical evidence proffered by the state, which showed higher 
drinking while driving among young men than women, in support of the 
policy.264 
 
 260 Id. at 211–12 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 261 Id. at 213–14. 
 262 Id. at 220–21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 263 Id. at 221. 
 264 Id. at 225–26. 
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In the years after Craig v. Boren, the Court accepted and applied an 
intermediate scrutiny standard to sex classifications in a number of cases.265  
But even as the standard seemed settled, the formula for review proved less 
than completely stable.  Starting with the 1979 case Personnel Administrator v. 
Feeney,266 a number of decisions emphasized the stringency of the Craig v. 
Boren test by noting that it requires “an exceedingly persuasive justification” 
from the government.267  In striking down Virginia Military Institute’s (VMI) 
exclusion of women in 1996, Justice Ginsburg for the Court interpreted “an 
exceedingly persuasive justification” not merely as a characterization of the 
standard, but as the standard itself.268  The Court found fault with Virginia’s 
proffered justification—that the exclusion of women was necessary to 
achieving VMI’s mission—because some women who would want to attend 
VMI could meet its standards.269  The ratcheting up of intermediate scrutiny in 
the majority opinion did not escape the notice or criticism of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, concurring, or Justice Scalia in dissent.  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
faulted the new language as having less “content and specificity” than the older 
formula270—which he had previously criticized for its own opacity.271  For his 
part, Justice Scalia excoriated the majority at length for its application of 
intermediate scrutiny in a manner that, in his view, amounted to strict 
scrutiny.272 
 
 265 See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (applying intermediate scrutiny to unemployment 
benefits provided by the Social Security Act to a father, but not a mother); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) 
(applying intermediate scrutiny to Alabama statute under which husbands, but not wives, may be required to 
make alimony payments); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (applying intermediate scrutiny to 
benefits provided by the Social Security Act that favor female wage owners over similarly situated male wage 
owners). 
 266 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 267 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 
455, 461 (1981). 
 268 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).  The groundwork for this move was laid by 
Hogan and J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).  In these cases, the Court also characterized 
the defendant’s burden as providing “an exceedingly persuasive justification” for the discrimination.  But, in 
the Court’s analysis, the way to meet this burden was, in essence, to show a substantial relation to an important 
governmental interest: the test derived from Craig. 
 269 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550. 
 270 See id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 271 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 219–21 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 272 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 570–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Only the amorphous ‘exceedingly persuasive 
justification’ phrase, and not the standard elaboration of intermediate scrutiny, can be made to yield this 
conclusion that VMI’s single-sex composition is unconstitutional because there exist several women (or, one 
would have to conclude under the Court’s reasoning, a single woman) willing and able to undertake VMI’s 
program.  Intermediate scrutiny has never required a least-restrictive-means analysis, but only a ‘substantial 
relation’ between the classification and the state interests that it serves.”). 
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As Kathleen Sullivan has written, “Intermediate scrutiny, unlike the poles 
of the two-tier system, is an overtly balancing mode.”273  The Supreme Court’s 
development of an intermediate scrutiny standard reflects how ill-equipped the 
bifurcated review regime is for evaluating the range of gender-based 
distinctions in public law.  But creating this new standard hardly fixed the 
problems of tiered review.  First, the new standard is ad hoc and improvised, 
and as such, lacks roots in constitutional theory.274  And second, introducing 
another tier of analysis may resolve a case, but it does not necessarily offer a 
workable solution to future cases with different questions and contexts.  The 
post-Craig drift in the intermediate scrutiny standard shows that the formula is 
unstable and, if anything, has grown more contentious over time. 
2. Undue Burdens and Abortion Rights 
The “undue burden” standard in abortion cases is another doctrinal device 
introduced to allow some latitude for balancing in a field of law previously 
governed by a rigid tiered review standard.  In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that 
restrictions on abortion before the point of viability would be subject to strict 
scrutiny.275  Given the Court’s rightward shift over the following two decades, 
Casey, which came before the Court in 1992, was widely expected to overturn 
Roe.276  The Court’s use of strict scrutiny in abortion cases had been under 
attack on the Court since 1989, with a plurality of Justices urging that 
restrictions on abortions should be subject only to rational basis review.277  In 
fact, Casey’s lead plurality opinion, authored jointly by Justices O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter, preserved the right to terminate pregnancies before the 
point of viability, but offered an undue burden standard to replace strict 
scrutiny as the framework for evaluating restrictions on that right.278  The 
plurality explained that a state places an undue burden on the right when “a 
state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”279  The plurality 
 
 273 Sullivan, supra note 8, at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 274 As Justice Rehnquist pointedly noted in dissent, the Craig test—that measures must be substantially 
related to the achievement of important government objectives—seems to “come[] out of thin air.”  Craig, 429 
U.S. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 275 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
 276 See David Margolick, Seeking Strength in Independence, Abortion-Rights Unit Quits A.C.L.U., N.Y. 
TIMES, May 21, 1992, at A20 (“It is in [Casey], argued last month before the Supreme Court, that abortion-
rights advocates expect the Court to either overturn or to greatly weaken Roe v. Wade.”). 
 277 Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 517–19 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 278 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
 279 Id. 
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opinion conceded that Justices might agree on the standard and yet disagree on 
its application in a concrete case: “Even when jurists reason from shared 
premises, some disagreement is inevitable.  That is to be expected in the 
application of any legal standard which must accommodate life’s complexity.  
We do not expect it to be otherwise with respect to the undue burden 
standard.”280 
Although the Casey dissenters alleged that the undue burden standard was 
an unprecedented and unprincipled invention,281 judges had previously 
undertaken undue burden analysis when asked to balance competing interests, 
in the abortion context and elsewhere.282  Notably, the undue burden language 
mirrors almost exactly the “unreasonable burden” standard applied in early 
dormant Commerce Clause cases.283  In our view, the proliferation of undue 
burden standards in U.S. constitutional law is not accidental.  This standard, 
like the move to intermediate scrutiny, is a means to allow courts to consider 
the interests on both sides of a constitutional controversy.  The introduction of 
such devices in domains previously governed by the bifurcated review regime 
is symptomatic of the mismatch between the rigidity of the doctrinal structures 
a court has inherited and the demands placed on constitutional judges in 
complex disputes raising multiple important values. 
3. Juvenile Curfew and Equal Protection 
The discussion above illustrates how intermediate scrutiny came into being, 
as a result of the struggle to situate the review of sex classifications within 
equal protection doctrine.  The cases below, which concern youth curfews, 
illustrate how the introduction of this new tier has added a measure of 
flexibility, but also a dose of confusion, to equal protection analysis when 
 
 280 Id. at 878 (citation omitted). 
 281 See id. at 964 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (describing 
the undue burden standard as “created largely out of whole cloth by the authors of the joint opinion”). 
 282 Abortion rights opinions that discuss some form of undue burden analysis include City of Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 463 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 
473 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976).  For more on the use of undue burden standards in and 
out of the abortion rights context, see Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden 
Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867 (1994); Valerie J. Pacer, Note, Salvaging the Undue 
Burden Standard—Is It a Lost Cause? The Undue Burden Standard and Fundamental Rights Analysis, 73 
WASH. U. L.Q. 295 (1995).  One author notes that 256 Supreme Court decisions issued between 1945 and 
1993 contain the phrase undue burden or the equivalent.  Curtis E. Harris, An Undue Burden: Balancing in an 
Age of Relativism, 18 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 363, 423 (1993). 
 283 See supra Part II.A. 
MATHEWS&SWEET GALLEYSFINAL  5/26/2011  8:59 AM 
2011] ALL THINGS IN PROPORTION? 855 
issues of first impression arise.  Intermediate scrutiny makes it easier for courts 
to strike an appropriate balance between the poles of strict scrutiny and rational 
basis deference.  But because intermediate scrutiny is not so much a 
theoretically justified standard as a “Goldilocks” solution—a happy midpoint 
between these extremes—courts seeking to sort new legal issues into the tiers 
have little guidance. 
A number of appeals courts have encountered challenges to local youth 
curfews over the past two decades, and the results—both as to standard of 
review and as to outcome—have varied wildly.  The Second Circuit held that a 
youth curfew should be examined under intermediate scrutiny and struck it 
down.284  The D.C. Circuit and Fourth Circuit each applied intermediate 
scrutiny to a challenged curfew but went on to uphold it.285  The Fifth Circuit 
determined that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard and sustained a 
curfew under that standard.286  The Ninth Circuit also applied strict scrutiny 
and struck down a curfew.287  Of course, nothing is unusual about circuit splits 
and differences in approach, and courts always frame issues based on how 
litigants frame their claims.  But we contend that the tiered review framework 
generates an extra measure of uncertainty and disagreement.  (We note also 
that all of the cases mentioned above included dissents—an unusual feature in 
appeals court decisions and another measure of the discord that these cases 
produce.)  We illustrate how the framework fails to provide adequate guidance 
by looking more closely at one case, the most recent, from the Second Circuit. 
Youth curfews present a double challenge to equal protection analysis.  
They seem to implicate both the fundamental rights and the suspect 
classification prongs of equal protection doctrine, but a categorical approach to 
either prong would not subject curfews to any real scrutiny.  The mobility right 
at issue is an important one, but not one conventionally included in the canon 
of “fundamental” rights.  And while juveniles are a discrete, vulnerable group, 
age is not considered a suspect classification.  Courts that believe youth 
curfews merit more than minimal scrutiny will therefore find themselves 
pushing against the categorical approach to equal protection analysis. 
 
 284 Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 176, 186 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 285 Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 541, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc); Schleifer v. City 
of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847, 855 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 286 Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 287 Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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Ramos ex rel. Ramos v. Town of Vernon concerned a challenge to a 
nighttime curfew, established in 1994 by local ordinance, for persons under 
age eighteen.  Angel Ramos, a minor resident of Vernon, Connecticut, and his 
parents sued the town in 1998, claiming, among other things, that the curfew 
impermissibly burdened the fundamental rights of minors.288 
The district court’s analysis of this claim was something of a jumble.  First, 
the court seemed to rule out a higher measure of scrutiny for this ordinance 
based on its disparate treatment of juveniles, reasoning that age is not a suspect 
classification.289  Then the court moved to take up the plaintiffs’ claim that the 
ordinance violated a fundamental right to travel.  But without pausing to 
consider whether this ordinance implicated any such right, the court 
immediately circled back to the relevance of the minor plaintiff’s age to his 
constitutional claim.  The court observed that “[t]he Supreme Court has never 
clearly indicated the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to legislation that 
affects minors,” but noted reasons given in the Bellotti plurality decision for 
treating children’s constitutional rights differently than those of adults.290  In 
the next sentence the court concluded, “After careful consideration of the 
Bellotti factors and other Supreme Court jurisprudence involving minors,”291 
the youth curfew should be subject to “less than the strictest level of scrutiny,” 
that is, intermediate scrutiny.292  The court did not share its “careful 
consideration” of these issues with the reader, and the choice of intermediate 
scrutiny was presented as a fait accompli. 
With the standard selected, the court’s analysis of the equal protection 
claim was brisk.  Because the plaintiffs did not deny the importance of the 
town’s stated interests—protecting the community from crime, and the safety 
and welfare of minors—the analysis turned on the issue of fit: Were the 
ordinance’s means substantially related to these goals?  The court concluded 
that they were.  The court noted that crime in Vernon had dropped since 
 
 288 See Ramos ex rel. Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 176, 188 (D. Conn. 1999), rev’d, 353 
F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003).  Ramos also raised vagueness, First Amendment overbreadth, and Fourth Amendment 
claims against the statute, as well as claims arising under the Connecticut constitution.  Id. at 180–81.  His 
parents also alleged infringement of their right as parents to direct the raising of their children.  Id. at 181.  The 
district court rejected all of the federal claims and certified the state law claims to the Connecticut Supreme 
Court, id. at 188, which rejected them.  See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 761 A.2d 705, 710 (Conn. 2000). 
 289 Ramos, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 184. 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. (quoting Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation 
mark omitted). 
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enactment of the curfew, and while declining to assert a causal connection, the 
court deferred to the legislative judgment that the ordinance was effective.293  
The court also noted that the ordinance’s limited hours were not unduly 
burdensome and that the numerous exceptions allowed most unobjectionable 
activities to continue after dark.294 
The plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
reversed the district court, finding an equal protection violation.295  The bulk of 
the Second Circuit’s analysis concerned selecting the proper tier for evaluating 
the curfew.  Although the appeals court’s inquiry was far more expansive than 
the district court’s, it too came up short, as the court arrived at the intermediate 
standard through a process of elimination and provided few affirmative reasons 
for why intermediate scrutiny was appropriate. 
The court began its analysis by declaring that the curfew implicated the 
fundamental right to intrastate travel, a right previously recognized in the 
Second Circuit.296  The court then asked whether this curfew, which would 
receive strict scrutiny if applied to adults, should be reviewed under a less 
stringent standard because it applies only to juveniles.297  The court noted that 
other circuits had reviewed curfews under each of the tiers and proceeded to 
consider the different approaches.298 
First the court considered, and rejected, rational basis review.  The court 
found no justification for concluding that juveniles are excluded from the right 
to intrastate travel, although greater limits on their rights than adults’ rights 
may be permissible, owing to the vulnerabilities and other characteristics of 
minors.  Since “denying the existence of a constitutional right is too blunt an 
instrument to resolve the question of juvenile rights to freedom of movement,” 
the court would “prefer to admit minors to the protected zone and then engage 
in a balancing of constitutional rights and children’s vulnerabilities.”299 
The court then considered, and rejected, strict scrutiny.  “Strict scrutiny,” 
the court argued, “embodies a constitutional preference for ‘blindness,’” and 
 
 293 Id. at 185–86. 
 294 Id. 
 295 Ramos ex rel. Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 187 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 296 Id. at 176. 
 297 Id. 
 298 Id. 
 299 Id. at 178. 
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should be deployed only where blindness as to classifications is desired.300  In 
the equal protection context, some rights—the fundamental rights—are so 
important that they should almost always be available without reference to any 
group classifications, and some classifications—the suspect classifications—
are in themselves so pernicious that the state should almost never use them.  
But, the court noted, “youth-blindness is not a goal in the allocation of 
constitutional rights.”301  Hence, strict scrutiny was not appropriate.  The court 
concluded, almost by default, that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate 
standard: “Hence, strict scrutiny would appear to be too restrictive a test to 
address government actions that implicate children’s constitutional rights.  
Consequently, we choose the second of the three approaches described above 
and apply intermediate scrutiny.”302 
A couple of features are worth noting about the court’s selection of a 
standard of review.  First, the analysis implicitly treats intermediate review as a 
residual category, to be adopted when neither of the traditional standards of 
review is suited to the issue at hand.  This is consistent with the genesis of 
intermediate review, but hardly adequate as a justification for choosing a 
standard of review.  Nowhere did the court build up an affirmative case for 
intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review (although the court 
did note that intermediate review has some advantages).  Second, in choosing a 
standard, the court slipped from the fundamental rights prong of equal 
protection analysis into a kind of suspect class view.  According to the court’s 
analysis, strict scrutiny is appropriate where “blindness” is the goal.303  But the 
court treated this case as belonging to the fundamental rights prong of equal 
protection analysis, not the suspect classification prong.304  As the court 
presented the issue, the relevant question to determine if strict scrutiny was 
appropriate is whether freedom of movement is so important a right that it 
should be afforded to individuals without regard to group classifications.305  
Instead, however, the court asked whether blindness to age is a goal in the 
allocation of constitutional rights.306 
 
 300 Id. at 179. 
 301 Id. 
 302 Id. at 180 (citation omitted).  The court went on to argue that intermediate scrutiny is flexible enough 
to allow legislation properly drafted to address the needs and vulnerability of children, but probing enough to 
disallow legislation justified by facile and untested generalizations about the young.  Id. at 181. 
 303 Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 304 See id. at 181 n.4 (noting that the Supreme Court has not generally considered age to be a suspect 
classification). 
 305 See id. at 179–81. 
 306 Id. 
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Having settled on intermediate scrutiny, the court then proceeded to 
evaluate the curfew.  The court identified two of the interests invoked by 
Vernon—protecting minors from harm and protecting the community from 
youth crime at night—as important.307  The question became whether the 
ordinance has a substantial relation to these goals.  The court found it did 
not.308  Although the ordinance was prompted by a concern about crime, the 
town provided no good reasons for its particular features: for the hours it was 
in effect, or for its application to minors.  Nor was there any proof that the 
curfew was responsible for a drop in crime.309  Therefore, the court concluded, 
the curfew violated equal protection.310 
In a wide-ranging dissent, Judge Ralph Winter took issue with, among 
other things, the court’s selection of intermediate scrutiny.  Judge Winter 
emphasized the well-established legal recognition of children’s custodial 
control by their parents, and denied that minors had a right to travel 
independent of parental control.311  Hence, the curfew should be subjected only 
to rational basis review, and upheld.312 
4. Evaluation 
The examples above demonstrate the persistent instability of tiered review.  
Some critics—including the authors of some of the dissents—might counter 
that this “instability” is really just a lack of judicial discipline.  Nothing forces 
judges to adopt new standards such as intermediate scrutiny or the undue 
burden test; when judges do so, they are recklessly pushing a political agenda 
without respect for precedent.  We note first that this charge cannot be leveled 
at the curfew ruling: when courts face questions of first impression, existing 
doctrine offers little or no guidance as to what standard should govern.313  And 
even if the pathologies of bifurcated review did not produce a Casey or a Craig 
in any deterministic sense, these rulings and many others are best understood 
as responses to the shortcomings of tiered review. 
 
 307 Id. at 182. 
 308 Id. at 185–87. 
 309 Id. at 186. 
 310 Id. 
 311 Id. at 188 (Winter, J., dissenting). 
 312 Id. at 190–91.  The dissent also considered, and rejected, the claim that the curfew burdened parental 
or guardian rights.  Id. at 190. 
 313 Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (evaluating the firearms restriction 
without selecting a standard of review). 
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Consider the sex discrimination cases again.  The two-tiered framework put 
judges in an impossible position: choosing between these dichotomous 
standards of review meant committing either to uphold, or to strike down, 
virtually every gender distinction in law.  In this situation, the incentive to find, 
or create, some middle ground was powerful.  That middle ground took the 
form of intermediate scrutiny.  And the improvisatory character of intermediate 
scrutiny opened the door for its future evolution.  If intermediate scrutiny had 
started life as a distinct standard of review with a deep grounding in 
constitutional theory rather than as a workaround to the difficulties of 
bifurcated review, the VMI majority might have found it more difficult to 
change the operative test.314  Of course, the members of the Court are 
responsible for the particular ways in which sex discrimination caselaw has 
developed.  But the broadest outlines of this development are influenced by the 
doctrinal structures that confront the Justices and constrain their moves. 
PA offers a more stable, principled alternative.  As a unified framework of 
analysis that allows a court to tailor the stringency of review to the particulars 
of each claim, PA sidesteps the conflict and confusion surrounding the choice 
of a standard of review.  Nor is this approach a far-fetched departure for 
American law.  As we have noted, Justices Marshall and Stevens have 
proposed something similar for equal protection claims.  Justice Marshall has 
argued that “the level of scrutiny employed in an equal protection case should 
vary with ‘the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely 
affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the 
particular classification is drawn.’”315  Adopting such an approach would not 
eliminate disagreement among judges, but it would refocus the disagreement 
onto the substantive issues of importance. 
The jurisprudence of the GFCC gives a glimpse into what a 
proportionality-based approach to an equality right looks like.316  Naturally, 
important differences exist between the Basic Law’s Article 3, which 
guarantees equality before the law, and the Constitution’s Fourteenth 
 
 314 See supra text accompanying notes 268–70. 
 315 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 316 A good overview of the doctrine in English can be found in Susanne Baer, Equality: The 
Jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249 (1999).  A more detailed 
treatment, albeit in German, can be found in a constitutional commentary, such as HANS D. JARASS & BODO 
PIEROTH, GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 90–137 (2006). 
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Amendment.317  And of course, adopting PA does not mean reaching the same 
outcomes as the German court—indeed, the Supreme Court could use PA and 
still replicate most of the judgments that they have arrived at by other means, 
and are worth preserving.  Still, the GFCC’s approach to Article 3 shows how 
proportionality can provide a stable argumentation framework for dealing with 
the most difficult legal issues.318 
Since the 1980s, the GFCC has construed the general equality right in ways 
that are tailor-made for PA.  The right amounts to a guarantee that any unequal 
treatment under the law be justified by a “sufficiently weighty reason.”319  
What counts as a sufficient reason depends on the particulars of the claim.  In 
effect, the more a distinction in the law threatens the core values of equality, 
the greater the state’s burden of justification.320  For instance, when a 
challenged measure cuts across the exercise of a fundamental right, or when 
groups are disadvantaged based on personal characteristics rather than 
voluntary behavior, the Court insists on “a strict application of the 
proportionality requirement.”321  On the other hand, when a measure implicates 
none of these factors, or falls within the particular competence of the 
legislature, the Court operates with a healthy degree of deference to 
distinctions drawn by the legislature. 322  Proportionality is no silver bullet, and 
Germany’s equality jurisprudence has not been free of controversy.323  But the 
basic framework, grounded in PA, has been stable and widely accepted. 
With respect to abortion politics, which have been ferocious in Germany,324 
the GFCC’s jurisprudence has had a legitimizing and stabilizing effect.  The 
GFCC has issued two landmark rulings on abortion, roughly contemporaneous 
 
 317 One notable difference is that Article 3 spells out what we would call “suspect classifications,” on the 
basis of which discrimination is not allowed.  GG art. 3(3) (“No person shall be favoured or disfavoured 
because of sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions.  No 
person shall be disfavoured because of disability.”); see also id. art. 3(2) (specifically addressing sex equality). 
 318 PA is not used across the board in the GFCC’s Article 3 jurisprudence, but increasingly it is 
supplanting older approaches.  See Baer, supra note 316, at 260.  We focus our discussion on the “new” 
proportionality-based approach to the general equality guarantee in Article 3(1). 
 319 BVerfG Apr. 28, 1999, 100 BVERFGE 138 (174); see also BVerfG May 30, 1990, 82 BVerfGE 126. 
 320 JARASS & PIEROTH, supra note 316, at 100; Baer, supra note 316, at 262. 
 321 BVerfG Mar. 2, 1999, 99 BVerfGE 367 (388). 
 322 JARASS & PIEROTH, supra note 316, at 99, 100.  The legislature has substantial latitude, for instance, in 
choosing the subjects and rates of taxation.  Id. at 109. 
 323 For a (now somewhat dated) overview of prominent critiques and controversies, see ALBERT 
BLECKMANN, DIE STRUKTUR DES ALLGEMEINEN GLEICHHEITSSATZES 1–2 (1995). 
 324 ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 109–14 (2000). 
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with Roe and Casey.325  These rulings established that, given Germany’s 
responsibility for the Holocaust and other crimes against humanity prior to and 
during World War II, the criminal law must always discourage abortion as a 
taking of life, but that abortion would nonetheless be permitted under certain 
specified conditions. 
In its 1975 decision, and in contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach, 
the GFCC held that the right to life covers the fetus.326  That finding comprised 
the critical starting point from which the balancing would proceed, given that 
the constitutional value represented by the life of the unborn child will, at 
times, conflict with the constitutional rights of the woman carrying the child, 
her human dignity, bodily integrity, and the free development of her 
personality.327  Summarizing a rich and sophisticated decision, the court held 
that to permit abortion without restriction, and without the express 
disapprobation of the state, would infringe too much on the right to life, and 
would therefore be unconstitutional;328 it also insisted, however, that the right 
to life did not extinguish the rights of pregnant women.329  Indeed, the court 
ruled, the latter’s rights must prevail in special circumstances.  Although 
abortion could not be decriminalized per se, the procedure could nonetheless 
go unpunished after mandatory counseling and when justified by genetic, 
medical, or social hardship reasons, or when the pregnancy resulted from 
rape.330 
In 1993, the GFCC upheld the basics of its earlier ruling, while creating an 
“unreasonable burden” (Unzumutbarkeit) test.  The test is rooted in the logic of 
proportionality: abortions would be tolerated by the criminal law if carrying a 
fetus to term would impose on a pregnant woman “heavy and unusual 
burdens” that go well beyond “reasonable sacrifice.”331  That is, “another 
interest”—of bodily integrity and self-determination—“equally worthy of 
constitutional protection asserts itself with such urgency that the state’s legal 
 
 325 BVerfG May 28, 1993, 88 BVERFGE 203 (“Abortion II”); BVerfG Feb. 25, 1975, 39 BVERFGE 1 
(“Abortion I”). 
 326 A careful comparison of the two approaches can be found in Richard E. Levy & Alexander Somek, 
Paradoxical Parallels in the American and German Abortion Decisions, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 109 
(2001).  An abridged translation of the two key German decisions is contained in KOMMERS, supra note 21, at 
336–56. 
 327 88 BVERFGE 203 (253). 
 328 39 BVERFGE 1 (44–46). 
 329 Id. at 47. 
 330 Id. at 48–50. 
 331 88 BVERFGE 203 (255); 39 BVerfGE 1 (48). 
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order cannot require the pregnant woman always to defer to the rights of the 
unborn.”332  Although scholars have debated whether the Unzumutbarkeit 
standard is identical to, or partially distinct from, proportionality,333 “the 
practical effect of the Unzumutbarkeit principle is to balance the unborn child’s 
right to life against the mother’s interest in bodily integrity and personal 
autonomy.”334 
Comparing the abortion jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
GFCC, and its broader reception, reveals some striking commonalities and 
differences.  The baseline constitutional rules in the two countries appear as 
opposites: the right to access abortion services prohibits a ban on abortions in 
the United States, while the unborn child’s right to life requires restrictions on 
abortion in Germany.  But as both courts have balanced, they have presided 
over a convergence in abortion law.335  Since Roe, however, abortion has 
become far and away the most controversial issue the Supreme Court touches, 
dominating the discourse during the confirmation of Justices and creating a 
social movement that challenges the political legitimacy of the Court itself.336  
The GFCC’s rulings on abortion were also politically controversial, but not 
because they were understood to be inconsistent, unprincipled, and inherently 
political.337 
We do not claim that proportionality is the key variable that explains this 
latter difference.  But it plays a crucial role in political acceptance of the 
GFCC’s involvement in regulating abortion.  In both abortion cases discussed 
above, the GFCC anchored its analysis in balancing, whose legitimacy had 
been built over previous decades.  This technique allowed the GFCC to give 
due consideration to the competing interests at stake, and required that the 
judges seek to reduce harms as much as possible.  Both German cases 
generated hard-hitting dissents.  But no dissenter questioned the 
 
 332 39 BVERFGE 1 (50) (quoted in KOMMERS, supra note 21, at 341). 
 333 See RÜDIGER KONRADIN ALBRECHT, ZUMUTBARKEIT ALS VERFASSUNGSMASSSTAB (1995) 
(distinguishing Unzumutbarkeit from proportionality). 
 334 Levy & Somek, supra note 326, at 122. 
 335 Id. at 111 (“In both countries, abortion is generally available early in the pregnancy after various 
informational, counseling and waiting restrictions; and is available later in the pregnancy to protect the life or 
health of the mother, as well as in cases of serious fetal deformity, rape, or incest.”). 
 336 See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007). 
 337 The difference in tone extends to the bench as well.  The German abortion rulings produced dissents, 
but none that challenged the legitimacy of the majority’s ruling, or the good faith of the justices, like Justice 
Scalia’s blistering dissent in Casey.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 982–1002 
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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appropriateness of balancing; rather, they challenged the relative weights given 
to the values in tension by the majority when it balanced. 
IV.  ALL THINGS IN PROPORTION? 
A. Bringing Proportionality Back In 
We have shown that the tiered review regime chronically generates 
pathologies that have weakened rights protection and undermined the 
coherence of rights jurisprudence in the United States.338  PA, while not a cure-
all for the challenges facing constitutional courts, avoids these pathologies by 
providing a relatively systematic, transparent, and trans-substantive analytical 
procedure for the adjudication of virtually all rights claims.  We also found that 
all three levels of review—rational basis, intermediate review, and strict 
scrutiny—have, at various points in their evolution, contained core elements of 
proportionality.  In our view, this finding bolsters our claim that no rights-
protecting court can, in practice, do without these elements unless it is willing 
to commit itself to a posture of abdication or absolutism. 
Together, these findings lead to the conclusion that embracing 
proportionality may well enhance the consistency and transparency of U.S. 
constitutional rights adjudication in a manner that keeps faith with our 
constitutional traditions and commitments.  No single, simple formula predicts 
how U.S. courts might go about amplifying and regularizing the elements of 
proportionality that already exist, sometimes partially buried, in our 
doctrines.339  While a detailed roadmap for this process is beyond the scope of 
 
 338 See supra Part III. 
 339 As we noted before, a number of areas of American constitutional law have interest-balancing tests 
that resemble PA.  Justice Breyer lists some of these in his Heller dissent.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 690 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 
403 (2000) (citing examples where the Court has taken such an approach); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 
535 U.S. 357, 388 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (commercial speech); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 
(1992) (election regulation); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339–49 (1976) (procedural due process); 
Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (government employee speech).  
The Supreme Court has employed balancing tests outside of the constitutional context as well.  Perhaps most 
famously, the “rule of reason” used to evaluate combinations and contracts in restraint of trade under section 1 
of the Sherman Act is a balancing test: the court asks whether net effect of a restriction on trade is pro-
competitive.  See Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).  Indeed, in recent years federal appeals 
courts have supplemented the Board of Trade balancing with an LRM test, so that the total effect closely 
resembles PA.  See Gabriel A. Feldman, The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of 
Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 561, 580 (2009).  Election law, too, has turned with increasing frequency 
to a standard that balances the state’s interest against the burden on an individual’s right to vote in a manner 
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this Article, we do suggest, in broadest strokes, some possibilities.  We hope 
these remarks might spark a broader discussion of what the reconciliation of 
U.S. rights review and proportionality might look like.  We conclude by noting 
and responding to objections to the arguments we have presented in this 
Article. 
As a starting point, we note again that Justices Marshall and Stevens have 
proposed, in concurrences and dissents, approaches to equal protection analysis 
that would displace tiered review in favor of a “sliding scale” review that more 
nearly approximates proportionality.340  Justice Marshall explained his 
alternative to the Court’s “rigidified approach to equal protection analysis” in 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: “As the nexus between 
the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws 
closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the 
degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a 
discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly.”341  For his part, Justice 
Stevens proposed a single standard, under which the state’s justificatory 
burden in establishing a “rational basis” for legislation is pegged to the 
classification employed—it is easier to provide a legitimate, neutral reason for 
treating people differently on the basis of profession, say, than on the basis of 
race.342 
Although the two standards are different,343 either could serve as a foothold 
for a PA-style, interest-balancing approach in equal protection analysis.  
Approaching equal protection in the spirit of Justice Marshall or Justice 
Stevens does not require the Court to reject existing doctrinal standards; rather, 
it provides a way to make sense of precedent by locating doctrine in a more 
expansive and coherent framework.  For instance, the sliding scale perspective 
unlocks a reappraisal of the compelling state interest test: what qualifies as a 
“compelling” interest for overcoming a rights claim will vary based on the 
intensity of the right infringement.  This perspective thus helps to recover the 
original role of strict scrutiny analysis as a form of rights-protective interest 
balancing.  In this view, the other standards of review represent points along a 
 
resembling proportionality.  See Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. 
L.J. (forthcoming 2011). 
 340 See James E. Fleming, “There Is Only One Equal Protection Clause”: An Appreciation of Justice 
Stevens’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2305–08 (2006) (describing the 
positions of both Justices). 
 341 411 U.S. 1, 102–03 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 342 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452–53 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 343 See Goldberg, supra note 10, at 519–24. 
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continuous spectrum of scrutiny, within a common master methodology.344  
Over time, the Court could elaborate these doctrinal structures into a more 
articulated framework where means–ends testing and interest balancing are 
handled in distinct phases.  And this proportionality standard could be applied, 
not only in equal protection but wherever tiered review now is operative. 
Pushing further, we see no reason to limit the adoption of PA to areas now 
governed by the three-tier regime.  Justice Breyer, joined in his Heller dissent 
by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, forcefully argued that the American 
approach to rights adjudication has always included elements of 
proportionality and balancing. 345  He then went on to demonstrate how a 
version of PA should be applied to the Second Amendment.346  The Second 
Amendment identifies a value to be maximized, subject to certain limitations.  
There is no question—and the majority did not suggest—that the right to bear 
arms implies that no restrictions (for instance, on any type of weapon, in any 
circumstance) are permitted.  Once the Court determines that the Second 
Amendment covers an individual’s right to bear arms outside of a militia 
context, the crucial questions must concern limits, which PA is designed to 
address.  In his dissent, Justice Breyer applied a version of PA to show that 
reasoning about limits could proceed in a principled, open way.  Certainly PA 
would have provided a surer guide to future cases in this area than the 
majority’s approach.  In declining even to pick a standard of review under 
which to evaluate state limitation of the right to bear arms, Justice Scalia 
provided no guidance for future cases. 
But a case like Heller is a rarity in that it presents a question of first 
impression about the existence of a right under one of the Constitution’s first 
ten amendments.  The twenty-first-century Court almost never writes on a 
blank slate.  Although many other areas of American constitutional law could 
benefit from the introduction of the proportionality principle, we also 
recognize that good reasons may exist for the Court to treat some rights—such 
 
 344 Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that cases in different 
tiers “actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion”). 
 345 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 693–719 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  In a celebrated 
2010 commencement address at Harvard, retiring-Justice Souter emphasized the inescapable conflicts between 
values involved in constitutional litigation.  Justice David H. Souter, Commencement Address at Harvard 
University (May 27, 2010), available at http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05/text-of-justice-david-
souters-speech/. 
 346 Heller, 554 U.S. at 693–719.  In his dissent, Justice Breyer regarded his approach—correctly—not as a 
great departure from the Court’s practice, but as a rationalization of techniques already in place, and of a piece 
with the standard of review employed in different areas.  Id. 
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as the Third Amendment’s prohibition against quartering—as clear, per se 
rules.347  Still, the Court has already determined, and consistently held, that 
most of the rights that are of importance to Americans are relative, not 
absolute.  Given that the Court already subjects important rights—including 
those expressed in absolute terms (e.g., the First Amendment)—to a litany of 
limitations and qualifications, courts would be justified in asking the following 
two questions.  First, why should every constitutional right not be protected by 
a necessity standard, that is, why should government be allowed to infringe 
more on any right than is necessary to achieve a declared public purpose?  
Second, do laws that have passed the narrow tailoring requirement nonetheless 
infringe more on the right than is tolerable given our constitutional 
commitments?  In asking these questions, judges would begin the work of 
reconceptualizing rights doctrine in terms of PA.348  Failure to consider these 
questions will, in most cases, weaken rights protection. 
That PA can fit with existing constitutional doctrine could be illustrated 
with reference to examples drawn from every area of the Court’s rights 
jurisprudence.  Here we will provide one more, concerning procedural due 
process claims arising from reputational injuries caused by state action.  Such 
claims are presently governed by Paul v. Davis.349  Paul concerned a challenge 
to a flyer distributed by local police that included the claimant’s name and 
photograph in a list of “Active Shoplifters” on the basis of an arrest for 
shoplifting that was never prosecuted.350  Paul established that merely showing 
that stigmatizing state action abridges liberty interests protected by the due 
process guarantee is not enough to establish a due process violation.  Rather, 
something else, some change in legal status, is also required, though the court 
did not explain what should happen once this “stigma plus” threshold is 
satisfied.351  Not surprisingly, the Paul decision has been roundly criticized for 
failing to set out standards for how courts should evaluate claims to procedural 
due process violations emerging from reputational injuries.352 
 
 347 U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 348 Cf. SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note 53, at 173 (proposing that proportionality “be adopted as a general 
standard of review”). 
 349 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
 350 Id. at 695. 
 351 Id. at 701. 
 352 See Barbara E. Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy of Paul v. Davis, 85 VA. L. REV. 
569, 571 (1999) (“Scholars have been relentlessly and uniformly negative in their reactions to the Supreme 
Court’s opinion and holding in Paul . . . .”); id. at 575–84 (collecting criticisms of Paul). 
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A PA approach would provide a neat solution to the problem.  Once a 
triggering stigma is identified, the Court would move into proportionality 
mode, asking what state interest is at stake, and whether the stigma-causing 
means are suitable for achieving it.  The Court would engage the LRM inquiry, 
and if that is satisfied, it would move to the final stage of analysis, where it 
asks whether the harm to the claimant is justified, all things considered.  The 
final balancing stage could effectively do the work now done—poorly—by the 
nebulous “plus” factor, the work of filtering out de minimis injuries.  This use 
of PA would also resonate with the Court’s balancing approach in Mathews v. 
Eldridge353 and its associated line of due process cases.  For our purposes, 
most important is that the basic structure of the right—the conditions that have 
to be satisfied to state a claim—can be established through the relevant 
precedents, and PA can solve the balancing problems that remain. 
A necessary task of rights review is defining the scope of rights, that is, 
determining the range of conduct that is protected by the right.  For instance, 
do the protections of the First Amendment extend to obscenity?354  PA is, of 
course, only an analytical procedure; it is otherwise without content.  
Everywhere PA flourishes, however, judges use it to structure a theory of the 
rights they adjudicate.  As Mattias Kumm observes, a legal system’s 
approaches to the questions of a right’s scope and a right’s limitation are 
logically linked.355  So it is in the United States as well.  Strict scrutiny, for 
example, represents an extremely stringent approach to limiting rights: a 
measure infringing a right is permissible only if narrowly tailored to a 
compelling interest.  The stakes of acknowledging a prima facie rights claim 
under strict scrutiny are huge, since the test for infringements stacks the deck 
in favor of the right.  It makes sense, then, that the Supreme Court would be 
reluctant to hold, for instance, that the full measure of First Amendment 
protection extends to commercial speech when doing so would lock the Court 
into an analysis that steamrolls over limits on, say, liquor advertisements, 
without regard to relevant differences between these and forms of expression 
nearer to the essential core of the First Amendment.356  A stingy approach to 
the limitation of rights goes hand in hand with a stingy approach to the scope 
 
 353 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 354 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (affirming that obscene material is not protected 
by the First Amendment). 
 355 See Mattias Kumm, Who Is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and 
the Constitutionalization of Private Law, 7 GERMAN L.J. 341, 347 (2006). 
 356 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
MATHEWS&SWEET GALLEYSFINAL  5/26/2011  8:59 AM 
2011] ALL THINGS IN PROPORTION? 869 
of rights: when the decision that a right is in play is so consequential, the 
borders of that right’s protection must be carefully policed. 
PA offers a different model.  As a balancing framework, PA expressly 
allows for the possibility that prima facie rights claims may be outweighed by 
competing values, as long as the other steps of the proportionality analysis are 
satisfied.  Because much less hinges on the prima facie determination that any 
right can be properly pleaded, judges can afford to define the scope of that 
right more broadly.  An example can help illustrate how the adoption of PA 
would impact U.S. rights review.  Free speech jurisprudence recognizes several 
carve-outs for expressive activities that merit less than the full measure of First 
Amendment protection, including fighting words,357 obscenity,358 child 
pornography,359 commercial speech,360 and advocacy of imminent lawless 
action.361  In a PA context, a court could arrive at these same outcomes through 
an explicit, rather than disguised, balancing process.  In effect, the court would 
recognize that, in fact, some expressive interests are at stake in these forms of 
conduct, but to a lesser degree than in the heartland of First Amendment 
speech.  Not only does PA all but require the court to construct a theory of 
speech rights, it also allows the court to sidestep some of the intractable border 
wars that the American penchant for rules and exceptions inevitably generates.  
We see few, if any, advantages to an approach that seeks to determine, once 
and for all, on which side of a line a particular case falls, or where to draw the 
lines separating rules from exceptions in the first place.  In any event, the 
American version of this approach has never actually succeeded in banishing 
balancing from the judicial tool kit.  Pushed out the front door, balancing 
comes in through the back, where it is used to create ever more nuanced rules 
and exceptions.362  In our view, the PA approach is less arbitrary than a binary 
“yes/no” response to the complexity of rights adjudication.  It builds flexibility 
and a concern for context into rights review, and it lessens the likelihood that 
judges will paint themselves into doctrinal corners. 
Finally, applying PA does not prevent courts from incorporating other 
modes of rights reasoning in their analysis.  For instance, a court that uses PA 
 
 357 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 358 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
 359 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 360 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
 361 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 362 See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 963–71. 
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may also categorically reject certain grounds of justification for state action.363  
Courts may exclude reasons in this way in order to provide added protection 
for important constitutional values.364  Suppose, for instance, that the 
government seeks to ban speech promoting certain social or political theories, 
on the grounds that they are incorrect and harmful.365  Under existing First 
Amendment doctrine, courts will not credit this rationale for government 
action.  Courts reject the government’s position not because the theories are 
not false or harmful—they could be—but because our theory of freedom of 
expression excludes reasons for state action based on viewpoint 
discrimination.366  Similarly, a PA court sharing the same First Amendment 
values may likewise decline to credit the government’s rationale, or give it any 
weight in the analysis.  In Mattias Kumm’s words, “Freedom of speech is not 
balanced against the harm done by proposing false ideas.”367  Indeed, Kumm 
correctly notes that PA may exclude reasons at two stages of the analysis: in 
assessing the legitimacy of the state’s aim, and in the balancing phase.368  
Thus, it is wrong to assume that a move to PA would mean abandoning the 
delicate constitutional architecture that American courts have constructed to 
give meaning to rights provisions. 
B. Objections 
We have tried to make the best case for adopting PA in the United States, 
but we recognize that there are countervailing considerations.  Here, we briefly 
discuss some of the important institutional and historical reasons why PA 
might appear to be a problematic fit for the American courts. 
Formal differences between the American system of judicial review and 
other contemporary systems of constitutional justice around the world are 
obvious and important.  Most powerful supreme and constitutional courts in 
the world today understand their central mission to be the robust protection of 
fundamental rights, not least since their respective constitutions prioritize 
 
 363 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 38–69 (1986). 
 364 See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 
45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 713 (1994).  Pildes demonstrates that defining excluded reasons was a dominant 
technique for adjudicating rights claims in the constitutional jurisprudence of the nineteenth century, id. at 
712–13, and Mattias Kumm, supra note 34, at 144–45, emphasizes its role in contemporary constitutional 
analysis. 
 365 See Kumm, supra note 34, at 144–45. 
 366 Id. at 145. 
 367 Id. 
 368 Id. 
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rights protection.369  Modern constitutions typically announce rights before 
state structures are constituted; most rights are qualified by limitation clauses; 
and the rights-protecting court is expressly designated as the authoritative 
interpreter of the higher law.  Further, the European constitutional courts—and 
the supreme courts of Canada, India, and South Africa to different degrees—
are not limited to “case or controversy” jurisdiction.  Cases come to them in 
diverse ways, often in the form of abstract constitutional questions about the 
meaning, scope, and application of rights.370  Constitutional judges have an 
obligation to answer these questions, no matter how controversial.  Indeed, 
giving constitutional answers to controversial, deeply “political” questions 
about rights is basic to their job description.371  In short, all modern, rights-
protecting courts perform an oracular function, a byproduct of which is law 
making (constitutional, legislative, administrative, and so on).372 
The American Supreme Court is not a specialized constitutional court.  In 
contrast to the modern constitutional court, the U.S. Constitution does not 
confer on the Court the power of constitutional judicial review.  Added as 
supplementary “amendments,” rights only surface after the organs of 
government are established.  Moreover, the American Constitution does not 
give interpretive primacy to the judiciary; in fact, perhaps the three branches, 
being coequal, have the same claim to competence and the same obligation to 
interpret and apply rights faithfully.373  In Marbury v. Madison, of course, the 
Court would derive its constitutional judicial review authority directly from its 
Article III “case or controversy” jurisdiction.374  Taking a highly formalist 
view, all judicial law making in the United States (constitutional, legislative, 
and so on) can be understood as a byproduct of the basic judicial (dispute 
resolution) function.  Of course, to claim that the Supreme Court remains 
principally a case or controversy court would do violence to reality, 
 
 369 See VÍCTOR FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES 36–54 (2009). 
 370 Id. at 66–67; STONE SWEET, supra note 324, at 343–46. 
 371 See COMELLA, supra note 369, at 72–73. 
 372 In such systems, the classic distinctions made between the “judicial function” (dispute resolution under 
the law) and the “legislative function” (the elaboration of law) break down.  In these systems, traditional 
notions of separation of powers become weak sources of systemic legitimacy.  Instead, the legitimacy of the 
constitutional order is critically linked to the constitutional court’s capacities to defend rights. 
 373 Prominent contemporary defenders of the “departmentalist” position—that neither the Founders nor 
the American Constitution meant to grant the judiciary supremacy with respect to constitutional 
interpretation—include Akhil Amar and Larry Kramer.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 
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downplaying the Court’s oracular, law-making function.  Although few serious 
observers would still make that claim, the Article III case or controversy 
limitation no doubt comprises an important part of the Supreme Court’s 
historical identity as a judicial organ, constraining the Court in meaningful 
ways. 
These organic differences must impact how rights are understood and how 
rights claims are adjudicated.  Across Europe, and in Canada and South Africa, 
constitutional judges face no serious or sustained challenge to their legitimacy 
when they protect rights, at least as a formal matter.  Indeed, constitutional 
judges would seriously undermine their political legitimacy if they were to 
abdicate their rights-protecting role, say, by adopting a rational basis standard 
as the norm for protecting rights.  In the United States, the specter of original 
sin (Marbury)375 and its evil potentials (Lochner),376 the defensive discourse of 
the counter-majoritarian difficulty, and the anxiety over what has become de 
facto judicial supremacy, has meant that any move by the courts away from 
deference and toward robust rights protection needs special justification.377  
American judges and legal academics have engaged in a seemingly endless 
production and critique of these justifications, but reached little consensus.  At 
the same time, counterpressure flows from the fact that many of the most 
important American rights are expressed in absolute terms, as rules to be 
enforced, which makes adopting a blanket rational basis posture deeply 
problematic, if not indefensible. 
As this discussion implies, a legal system’s rights doctrines constitute, and 
will then embody, notions of what rights are in that system.  Kumm explains 
that such notions tell us “what . . . you have in virtue of having a right.”378  
Although the topic raises jurisprudential issues far beyond the scope of this 
Article, it should be obvious that important structural differences will still 
distinguish doctrines that reference a conception of rights as “trumps” (in 
Dworkin’s sense), those that conceive of rights as defensive “shields” 
(insulating the sphere of the private from the reach of state action), or as 
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 376 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 377 The most influential statements of the problem and (partial) justification of judicial supremacy remain, 
respectively, ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), and JOHN HART ELY, 
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 378 Kumm, supra note 34, at 131. 
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“optimization requirements” (in Alexy’s sense).379  The Supreme Court, of 
course, has not settled on any dominant “theory” of “what rights are,” which 
partly accounts for the systemic incoherence of its rights jurisprudence. 
Europeans were forced to rethink and reconstruct their constitutional law 
after the horrors of the Holocaust and the destruction of World War II.380  The 
new Federal Republic of Germany firmly committed itself to protecting 
fundamental rights at the highest possible level, while the prestige of political 
parties and legislative authority was relatively low.  The collapse of fascist-
authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe in the 1970s, and then across Central 
and Eastern Europe and the Balkans in the 1990s, reproduced that situation in 
key respects, and the German approach to constitutionalism was copied and 
extended.  During these latter episodes, those who drafted new constitutions 
saw no contradiction between democracy and rights protection.  On the 
contrary, a robust system of rights protection was viewed as a precondition for 
democratic rule.  Today, even after the consolidation of stable party systems, 
European citizenries continue to support constitutional courts—which they 
equate with rights protection—far more than they support legislatures.  Where 
an ideology of fundamental rights has congealed as a kind of civic religion, 
rights jurisdiction may ground the legitimacy of constitutional review.  
Tellingly, this civic religion of rights now also permeates common law 
jurisdictions, including our neighbor to the north, Canada, which (like Israel) 
adopted PA from the Europeans. 
In the United States, some judges and academics have always portrayed PA 
and balancing as antithetical to American notions of popular sovereignty and, 
therefore, to democracy itself.  We reject this portrayal, not least, as 
unsupported by the facts.  In the post-New Deal period, when the U.S. 
Supreme Court moved to protect fundamental rights more robustly, it too 
began to look like a modern, rights-protecting constitutional court and less like 
a case or controversy court.  The Court relaxed standing doctrines, and abstract 
review—in the form of facial challenges and related constitutional remedies—
emerged and became routine in some areas; the Court frankly assumed a more 
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 380 Jed Rubenfeld argues that, due to this fact, the American and European conceptions of 
constitutionalism, rights, and democracy are fundamentally at odds with one another.  Jed Rubenfeld, The Two 
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oracular role as a constitutional lawmaker.381  One might say that, for the first 
time, a system of constitutional justice began to appear in America, with rights 
protection at its core.  With the important exception of property rights, the 
Court reserved deference doctrines, such as rational basis, for only those rights 
judged not to be “fundamental.”  Further, it began to theorize the rights being 
favored more explicitly, which went hand in hand with the development of 
doctrinal tests that one finds central to PA. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have sought to describe and assess the evolution of 
American rights doctrine, not just on its own terms, but with reference to 
constitutional law and practice elsewhere.  Our first motivation was, in fact, 
comparative and empirical.  In a first stage of this project, we developed a 
theoretical explanation of why rights-protecting judges would be attracted to 
PA: it provides the best-possible response to the challenges of adjudicating 
qualified rights, and it offers a (partial) solution to certain intractable 
legitimacy dilemmas generated by judicial law making and supremacy.382  In a 
second stage, we tracked the emergence and global diffusion of PA.  Today, all 
of the world’s most powerful constitutional courts have adopted a version of 
PA, which they deploy as an overarching analytical framework for 
adjudicating rights.  Arguably, PA now constitutes the defining doctrinal core 
of a global, rights-based constitutionalism.  Here, we have sought to bring 
these considerations to bear on the American case, not least because the United 
States is often characterized (especially by non-Americans) as an outlier, an 
island unto itself, a legal system that refuses to participate in the transnational 
conversation about rights adjudication that has exploded into prominence in 
recent years.  While we would agree that the American constitutionalism is ill-
equipped either to engage in constitutional dialogues across borders or to 
exercise positive influence on the evolution of global constitutionalism, it is 
not true that the American system has rejected either balancing or 
proportionality.  Instead, as we have shown, elements of PA have deep roots in 
American constitutional law, and American courts, try as they sometimes do, 
have never been able to dispense with balancing when they adjudicate rights. 
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Our second motivation was normative.  We have argued that the American 
courts would benefit, on balance, from standardizing rights doctrine under a 
version of PA.  To take just one example, we have identified three endemic 
pathologies of American rights jurisprudence and shown the various ways in 
which PA would enable the courts to mitigate these pathologies, or to eliminate 
them altogether.  Our normative claims are informed by both our theoretical 
priors and our comparative findings.  We stressed that one of the virtues of PA 
is that it allows a court to maximize its own flexibility, with reference to the 
constitutional values and interests it protects, and with regard to present and 
future litigants.383  Flexibility inheres in PA in another way: courts can adapt 
PA to fit their own purposes.  In fact, how courts use PA varies widely across 
jurisdictional boundaries.384  To those who would claim that the proportionality 
framework is “foreign law” and therefore alien to American constitutionalism, 
we would reply that the United States has, at different times, evolved 
“homegrown” versions of PA.  This Article shows as much.  If the Supreme 
Court were to develop a more formalized version of PA, along the lines that we 
have argued, it would be an American creation, referencing existing caselaw 
and consistent with our own constitutional traditions and values.  In any event, 
the problem of balancing in American rights adjudication lies once again at the 
top of the Supreme Court’s agenda.  One hopes that, this time, the Justices will 
consider more deeply the merits of what is the most tried and tested approach 
to that problem: the proportionality principle.385 
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